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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
In re Varner' involved an action instituted in superior court for
a temporary injunction to restrain enforcement of the county board
of education's assignment of Varner to a school in Randolph County until a final decision could be had on an appeal from the action
of the board in denying Varner's application for reassignment to
a school in Davidson County. The temporary injunction was granted
and the supreme court not only sustained the injunction, but also
stated that the pending superior court review of the board action
denying reassignment would be a matter de novo before the superior
court. The superior court would have the same powers, duties, and
standards to guide it as the board had in the first instance, and
there should be a determination by jury trial as to whether the
student was entitled to reassignment to another school.
The legislature has given county and city school boards author2
ity to assign students within their districts to appropriate schools
with right of appeal from such action to the superior court.3 The
statutory appeal provision requires a de novo review in the superior
court. It directs that court, in the event the board's decision is set
aside, to make a reassignment to such school as the court finds the
student is entitled to attend.4 In Varner the court did not discuss
the question of whether such a statute would be unconstitutional on
the ground that it requires the court to perform a non-judicial function in violation of the constitutional mandate that governmental
functions be separate and distinct,5 and the constitutional provision
vesting courts with judicial power. 6
-266 N.C. 409, 146 S.E.2d 401 (1966).

'N.C.
'N.C.

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 115-176 (1960).

GEN. STAT. §

GEN. STAT.

115-179 (1960).

§ 115-179 (1960):

Upon such appeal, the matter shall be heard de novo in the superior
court before a jury in the same manner as civil actions are tried and
disposed of therein. ... If the decision of the court be that the order
of the county or city board of education shall be set aside, then the
court shall enter its order so providing and adjudging that such child
is entitled to attend the school as claimed by the appellant, or such
other school as the court may find such child is entitled to attend. ...
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Basically, the legislature may confer jurisdiction upon courts for
limited review of administrative decisions without constitutional
difficulties.7 The general rule, however, is that the constitutional
limitation of courts to the exercise of judicial power has been violated when a court upon review is required or permitted to substitute
its judgment or discretion for that of the agency as such exercise
of judgment and discretion is an administrative function.8 The
underlying rationale seems to be that the constitution vests in courts
only judicial power, and the performance of a function that is administrative is not within the power of the court.
The question of whether a judicial or non-judicial function is
exercised upon review of administrative decisions is not always easy
to answer. The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress could vest the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
with power to substitute its judgment for that of the Radio Commission upon review of the commission's determination of whether
a radio broadcasting license should issue. Although such a function
is administrative, it could be vested in that court since it is not
created under the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.0 However,
since the Supreme Court is created under the Judiciary Article and
therefore vested with judicial power only, the Court held that it
could not participate in the administrative process by hearing an
appeal from a proceeding in the court of appeals pursuant to its
statutory authority to exercise such administrative functions.10 Later
the Radio Act 1 was amended by limiting the scope of review in
the court of appeals to questions of law and providing that the findings of fact by the commission would be conclusive unless found to
"Harrison v. Civil Serv. Conmn'n, 1 Ill. 2d 137, 115 N.E.2d 521 (1953) ;
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 329 Mass. 265,

107 N.E.2d 807 (1952) ; In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948) ;
Fire Dep't v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664 (1949).
'Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947);
Fuller v. Mitchell, 269 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); see generally,
4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 29.10 (1958).
'U.S. CONST. art. III. This article, vesting the courts with only judicial
power, does not limit the jurisdiction that Congress can confer upon the
courts of the District of Columbia as Congress can confer upon those courts
broader jurisdiction pursuant to its legislative power over the District under
Article I. Congress can vest the courts of the District "not only with the
powers of federal courts in the several states but with such authority as a
State may confer on her courts." Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S.

428, 443 (1923).
10
1

Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
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Under these circumstances the Supreme

Court held it did have the power to hear appeals from the reviewing
court as the reviewing court was then limited to the exercise of a
judicial function. The Court noted that the questions of law were
whether the commission applied legislative standards validly set up,
whether it acted within the authority conferred, and whether its
proceedings satisfied the requirements of due process. It felt that
these were appropriate questions for judicial decision. 1 3 Apparently
the Court feels the determination of the legality of administrative
action is judicial whereas actual participation in the administrative
process by the exercise of independent judgment or discretion as to
what the decision of the agency should have been is not judicial.' 4
The question thus presented is not whether the original function
was judicial but whether the question presented on appeal requires
the exercise of a judicial or non-judicial function. One test employed is a determination of whether the question on review is of

the type that courts traditionally decided or whether it is of the kind
traditionally handled by the legislature prior to the rise of administrative agencies.' 5 Among the specific functions held to be administrative 0 and not exercisable by the courts are the granting or
revoking of liquor licenses' 7 and banking franchises,'" the fixing of
rents, 19 the selection of school sites,2" the determination of attorneys'
fees in proceedings before the Industrial Commission, 2 ' and the
determinations of zoning boards.2 On the other hand the exercise
"'Act of July 1, 1930, ch. 788, 46 Stat. 844, amending 44 Stat. 1169
(1927).
"Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266 (1933).
1" Compare Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage
Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933) with Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co.,
281 U.S. 464 (1930) and Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428
(1923).
"Floyd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 44 Wash. 2d 560, 269 P.2d
563 (1954).
"The examples are merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive.
" De Mond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547
(1943).
" Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896 (1942).
" Baldwin Gardens v. McColdrick, 198 Misc. 743, 100 N.Y.S.2d 548
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
" Board of Educ. v. Allen, 243 N.C. 520, 91 S.E.2d 180 (1956).
" Brice v. Robertson House Moving, Wrecking & Salvage Co., 249 N.C.
74, 105 S.E.2d 439 (1958).
"Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fox, 402 Ill. 617, 85 N.E.2d 43 (1949). Here
the court held that it was not exercising the administrative function since
the review was limited to the question of the legality of the board action.
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of a judicial function is required in the determination of whether
an agency acted upon authority which could be conferred upon it
constitutionally, acted within its statutory authority, 24 acted arbitrarily or capriciously, 25 or in disregard of law,2" and whether it
based its decision on insufficient or incompetent evidence, 27 or committed other errors of law.2 The North Carolina court appears to
have recognized the distinction in Pue v. Hood.29 There the court
refused to grant certiorari to review the action of the Commissioner
of Banks in denying an application for a franchise. The reasoning
was that the action of the commissioner was an administrative
function and that there would be no judicial question on review in
the absence of allegations as to the unconstitutionality of the Banking Act or allegations of errors of law. The court said:
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact
that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers.30
The decision implies, however, that the determination of the constitutionality of the legislative act and the question of whether
errors of law were committed would require the exercise of judicial
power. It thus appears that the line is drawn between a determination of the legality of the administrative action and the exercise of
the precise function entrusted to the agency or officer.
Statutes that confer jurisdiction for de novo review of administrative decisions further complicate the distinction between judicial
and non-judicial functions. Upon de novo review does the court
decide the same issue presented in the administrative proceeding, or
does it merely determine the legality of the administrative decision?
" Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Jones, 112 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
"*State Bd. of Medical Registration v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d
602 (1943).
'"Burton v. City of Reidsville, 243 N.C. 405, 90 S.E.2d 700 (1956).
Ibid.
' Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022
(1942).
" Brice v. Robertson House Moving, Wrecking & Salvage Co. 249 N.C.
74, 105 S.E.2d 439 (1958).
896 (1942).
2 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d
80 Id. at 314, 22 S.E.2d at 899.
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Some courts hold that since de novo review permits the finding of
facts anew, it also permits the court to substitute its own independent judgment or discretion for that of the agency upon the facts
as found by the court.3" In so holding those courts do not raise the
questions of whether such action would constitute the exercise of a
non-judicial function and whether the exercise of a non-judicial
function would be permissible. On the other hand, the Connecticut
Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature could not vest the
judiciary with power to grant or revoke licenses-an administrative
function. It interpreted a statute granting de novo review of licensing board decisions not to be a grant of power to substitute its
judgment for that of the board, but merely to mean the court would
not be confined to the facts found by the board in making its independent judgment as to whether the board acted legally.32 Also, in
Texas it is held that a review de novo of administrative decisions
does not vest the courts with the administrative function of determining whether a license, permit, or certificate of convenience should
issue, but merely gives the courts authority to determine whether the
action of the agency was beyond the power it could exercise constitutionally, beyond its statutory power, or based upon substantial
evidence. 3 The North Carolina court applied similar reasoning in
In re Wright" where the court found that a de novo review of the
revocation of a driver's license required the exercise of a judicial
and not an administrative function. The decision was based on the
fact that no discretion was given the court to grant or revoke the
license and the court had authority only to review the facts upon
which the agency based its decision.
In view of the foregoing analysis it does not appear that the
question of whether a judicial or an administrative power is exercised is concluded by whether or not the court is required to find
facts anew. It is the type of determination the court is required or
permitted to make upon such facts found that determines the nature
" Carnegie v. Department of Pub. Safety, 60 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1952);
Dimitroff v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 209 Ore. 316, 306 P.2d 398 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939); Harrison v.
Hopkins,
48 R.I. 42, 135 Atl. 154 (1926).
2
De Mond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547
(1943).
" Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Jones, 112 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
'228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948).
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of the power exercised.' 5 It appears that a determination as to the
legality of an administrative decision, although made upon de novo
review, requires a judicial determination, whereas a determination
of whether a license should be revoked or an assignment made to
one school or another requires the exercise of administrative power.
If the review of reassignment proceedings in Varner had been
merely de novo, it appears that an interpretation in favor of its
constitutionality could have been had. However, the court correctly
interprets the statute to vest the court with the authority to make
the assignment to such school the court finds the student is entitled
to attend." Such authority is the same authority originally given
the administrative agency.3 7 The exercise of this authority by the
courts seems inconsistent with the constitutional provisions vesting
courts with judicial power" and requiring governmental functions
to be separate and distinct. 9 Indeed, the court stated in Burton v.
City of Reidsville :4o "In any event, we operate under the philosophy
of the separation of powers, and the courts were not created or
vested with authority to act as supervisory agencies to control and
direct the action of executive and administrative agencies or officials." 4'
It is submitted that the court should decline to exercise the administrative function of assigning students to schools and confine its
review to the question of the legality of the administrative decision.
It may be argued that there is little difference in holding the decision
of an agency to be arbitrary or capricious on the one hand and entering an order for reassignment on the other. But such an argument
disregards the historical experience with tyrannical government giving rise to the separation philosophy. It also ignores the need for
separation in obtaining more efficient administration of governmental functions. A consequence of requiring or permitting courts
to make these administrative determinations could be the burdening
of the courts with an almost infinite volume of such determinations
" For a thorough analysis on this point see Railroad Comm'n v. Shell
Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942).
"Consider the language of the act as quoted in note 5 supra. For the
court's interpretation see In re Varner, 266 N.C. 409, 417, 146 S.E.2d 401,

409 (1966); In re Hayes, 261 N.C. 616, 622, 135 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1964).
,N.C. Gnir. STAT. § 115-176 (1960).
8 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
N.C.N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
,243
405, 90 S.E.2d 700 (1956).
,Id. at 408, 90 S.E.2d at 703.
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to the detriment of efficient performance of their judicial duties. A
further consequence would be the frustration of the primary objective sought by creation of administrative agencies, i.e., to provide
for disposition of specialized and complicated problems by agencies
equipped with expert knowledge and experience essential to more
efficient disposition of such problems.
JERRY M). TRA M MELL

Admiralty-Recovery of Counsel Fees as Damages in
Maintenance and Cure Actions
In Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp.1 the libellant, a seaman with
an extended history of back trouble, brought six consolidated admiralty actions against shipowners for maintenance and cure. Although it was impossible to establish the origin of the seaman's
back condition, it was established that the libellant had had separate
attacks while aboard different ships, followed by periods of remission sufficient to make him fit for duty. The owners of the ships
upon which an attack occurred were found to be primarily liable for
the seaman's maintenance until he again became fit for duty. The
owners of the ships upon which the seaman became ill or disabled
due to an attack that had occurred on a previous ship, but from
which the seaman had not yet obtained maximum cure, were held to
be secondarily liable for the libellant's maintenance. In each of the
claims for maintenance and cure, the recovery of counsel fees was
allowed as an element of damages. Secondarily liable shipowners
were even awarded recovery from primarily liable shipowners of
counsel fees that the former were obligated to pay the seaman.
Traditionally, counsel fees have not been an element of recovery
for maintenance and cure actions.' However, in 1962, the United
States Supreme Court in the historic decision of Vaughan v. Atkinson,8 a maintenance and cure action, awarded counsel fees to the
1256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

'In maintenance and cure claims, the courts have allowed consequential
damages, Sims v. United States of America War Shipping Administration,
186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); and necessary
expenses, Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
*369 U.S. 527 (1962), reversing 291 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1961), 200 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1959).

474
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libellant as an element of damage.4 In that case, the seaman entered
a United States Public Health Service Hospital five days after the
termination of a voyage aboard the respondent shipowner's vessel.
For approximately three months, he was treated as an inpatient for
suspected tuberculosis. After being discharged, he was treated as
an outpatient for two years before again being declared fit for duty.
Shortly after being admitted, the libellant forwarded to the owner's
agent an abstract of his clinical record at the hospital showing a
strong probability of active tuberculosis. However, the owner made
no investigation of the seaman's claim and did not even bother to
admit or deny the validity of it.5 As a result, for two years the
libellant was on his own and ultimately had to hire an attorney to
recover his claim. Though there was no precedent for allowing
counsel fees as damages in a maintenance and cure action, the Supreme Court followed the logic that admiralty courts were authorized to invoke equitable principles,' that there is precedent for allowing counsel fees in equity actions' and thus, that counsel fees might
be an appropriate element of recovery for maintenance and cure."
As to the test that the Supreme Court used to determine when
counsel fees could be recovered in maintenance and cure actions, at
least two distinct views have developed. In Vaughan, the Supreme
Court spoke of the "callous" attitude on the part of the shipowner
in "making no investigation of the libellant's claim" 9 and the default
of the shipowner "being willful and persistent."'" It was found
"difficult to imagine a clearer case of damages suffered for failure to
pay than this one."" In subsequent lower court decisions the problem arose whether a callous attitude on the part of the shipowner
was a prerequisite to recovery of counsel fees, or whether it merely
made the case for counsel fees stronger.
'The court definitely stated that the question involved damages and "not
the usual problem of what constitutes 'costs' in the conventional sense."
369 U.S. at 530.
Id.at 528.
'See, e.g., Rogers v. Paul, 232 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
T
See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
339 U.S. 684 (1950); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
'Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962). See Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 291 F.2d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 1961) (dissent by Chief Judge
Sobeloff).
0 369 U.S. at 530.
10369 U.S. at 531.
"1369 U.S. at 531.
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The majority of the courts dealing with this have required a
finding of willful default or callous action by the shipowner before
2
an award of counsel fees is allowed in a maintenance and cure case.
This is perhaps a means of refraining from too radical a departure
from the general rule that counsel fees are not recoverable. 1 3 Thus,
a shipowner who paid maintenance to a seaman until the Public
Health Service certified the seaman as fit for duty was held not
liable for counsel fees because he had not acted in bad faith, callously, or unreasonably.' 4 Another shipowner, who depended on a
prediction by the Public Health Service that the libellant would be
fit for duty on a certain date, quit paying maintenance on that date
although the libellant had actually failed to recover. There was no
evidence that the shipowner knew of this, though there was never
any investigation by the shipowner to see if the seaman had in fact
recovered, or examination by the Public Health Service certifying
the seaman as fit for duty. Still, attorney's fees were denied because
the court could not say that the defendant acted in bad faith, callously, or unreasonably.' 5 In another case, a seaman who made no claim
for maintenance and cure prior to the institution of the lawsuit, was
denied counsel fees because there had been no default, willful or
otherwise, by the shipowner.' Many of these courts have specifically
rejected a more liberal interpretation of Vaughan and have considered a showing of callousness or recalcitrance on the part of the
" See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §§ 61, 71 (1935).
"' Pyles v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.

Tex. 1965). The court held that good faith reliance on the Public Health

Service certification enabled the shipowner to suspend maintenance payments and remove the case from the rule of Vaughan. It stated that the
better authorities limited the Vaughan case to situations in which the defendant deliberately, flagrantly or unjustifiably refused to pay maintenance at
any time. Accord, Diddlebrock v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 234 F. Supp. 811,
814 1 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court
pointed out that even a flat finding by the Public Health Service that the

seaman was fit for duty would not be conclusive evidence in court. The
court cited Koslusky v. United States, 208 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1953) and

Diniero v. United States Lines Co., 185 F. Supp. 818, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),

aff'd, 288 F.2d 595. Thus, a prediction that the libellant will be fit for duty

on a certain date would carry even less weight and could conceivable raise
the duty of the shipowner to investigate the libellant's claim to determine its
merit. An investigation might have clearly shown the libellant's right to

necessity of a lawsuit.
maintenance and cure and might have precludedF. the
Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1964).
' Connorton v. Harbor Towing Corp., 237
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shipowner a necessary requirement for recovery of attorney's fees.
These courts consider this the overwhelming majority view.1 7
Other courts have used language similar to the above test of
callousness or recalcitrance in speaking of the duty of a shipowner
to properly investigate the libellant's claim to determine its merits.' s
The Vaughan opinion noted this duty of the shipowner to properly
investigate and found that the shipowner had callously breached it.'9
The principal case developing the shipowner's duty to investigate a
claim for maintenance and cure with reasonable diligence was
Stewart v. S.S. Richmond." It found the shipowner's breach to be
arbitrary and unreasonable in the face of the overwhelming proof
of the merit of the claim. The libellant had presented the shipowner
an unfit for duty certificate from the Public Health Service along
with his own doctor's report that maximum cure had not been
reached. The court found that the shipowner was lax in investigating a claim which they would have found to have merit.2'
It seems possible that the duty to investigate could be negligently
breached by the shipowner, so that he could become liable for the
seaman's counsel fees without a specific showing of bad faith. However, there does not seem to be any authority specifically allowing
recovery of attorney's fees by the seaman for the shipowner's negligent failure to investigate the merits of the maintenance and cure
claim. But such a test would seem to be consistent with the liberal
policies in favor of the seaman enumerated by the courts in expanding the application of maintenance and cure.
Some courts have disregarded the requirements of willful default, callous action, or breach of duty to investigate as prerequisites
to the recovery of counsel fees in favor of a more liberal interpretation of Vaughan. These courts grant that bad faith by the ship"'Roberts v. S.S. Argentina, 359 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. Johnson
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 335 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1964).
"6See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
10369 U.S. at 530.
0 214 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. La. 1963).

' When a claim for maintenance is made, there is an affirmative duty
upon the shipowner to investigate the claim with reasonable diligence ....

Moreover when there is substantial evidence that a ship-

owner is dilatory in making such an investigation or if it fails to make
an investigation which would have disclosed the merit of the seaman's

claim, the seaman may recover the damages resulting from the failure

to pay maintenance as well as attorney's fees incurred in getting the
maintenance from the shipowner.

Id. at 137.
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owner makes the case for counsel fees stronger, but feel it is not a
prerequisite to recovery. One group of opinions has interpreted
Vaughan as meaning counsel fees are discretionary with the court.
In Hurte v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co.,' the Eighth Circuit allowed
counsel fees in an action for maintenance and cure with no discussion other than that the libellant can recover attorney's fees for the
shipowner's failure to provide that to which the libellant was entitled. The court made no mention of the revelance of the shipowner's attitude or actions in dealing with the libellant's case. The
same judge, two years later, in awarding attorney's fees in another
action for maintenance and cure, simply stated that recovery was
discretionary with the court.m Under this interpretation of Vaughan,
recovery of counsel fees is not automatically required as a payment
of damages. Valid reasons might exist for not voluntarily paying a
claim. So long as the shipowner acted equitably with a bona fide
desire to comply with the law, and provided maintenance that was
justly and obviously due, damages by way of counsel fees would not
necessarily be allowed. 4 This interpretation of Vaughan seems to
be more in line with the policy favoring seamen in maintenance and
cure actions than the interpretation that callous actions on the part
of the shipowner must be shown before counsel fees are awarded.
The need for callous actions places a burden on the seaman to show
that the shipowner did indeed act callously, while the discretionary
or honest dispute interpretation would seem to generally assume that
counsel fees may be awarded in maintenance and cure actions. This
would place on the shipowner the burden of showing that he is
within the exception of not being liable for counsel fees because he
acted equitably and an honest dispute did exist.
An even more radical departure from the requirement of a
showing of callous action by the shipowner has been made by some
courts. This is the theory of allowing the seaman to recover his
counsel fees anytime he is forced to litigate his claim for mainte2'221 F. Supp. 885, 890 (E.D. Mo. 1963). See Smith v. Seitter, 225 F.
Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.N.C. 1964) ; Sims v. Marine Catering Serv., Inc., 217
F. Supp. 511 (D. La. 1963).
" Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 629, 633 (E.D. Mo.
1965).
" The intention and purpose of the Supreme Court in Vaughan was that
"the trial court should make the seaman 'whole,' i.e. he should not be
required to pay money out of his pocket to collect maintenance lawfully due
him." Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575, 576 (E.D. Va. 1962) (on
remand).
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nance and cure. The payment of counsel fees by the shipowner in
a litigated maintenance and cure claim is felt by such courts to be
an automatic obligation that does not turn on the issue of the shipowner's recalcitrance. The main case espousing this interpretation
of Vaughan is Jordan v. Norfolk Dredging Co. 5 There, according
to the libellant and the finding of the court, Jordan had injured his
back while aboard ship five or six months before his employment
was terminated. He then reinjured his back before he left the ship
and was able to continue work only with the help of his fellow deckhands. However, no complaint of back trouble was ever made to
officials of the operating company until one month after the libellant
had quit work. After Jordan made his claim, a company representative told him it was doubtful whether he was entitled to maintenance
and cure and as a result, Jordan had to litigate his claim to recover.
The court expressed grave doubts that there was any callous behavior
on the part of the shipowner toward the libellant. However, it felt
that the Supreme Court in Vaughan had expressly rejected the recovery of counsel fees on the basis of unconscionable behavior by the
shipowner."8 The court admitted that the Supreme Court did refer to
callous, willful and persistent behavior, and that the language of the
Vaughan opinion was not clear, but defended its view in light of the
policies and authority upon which the decision restedY
" 223 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Va. 1963). This case was tried in the same

district in which the Vaughan case was originally tried and to which it was
remanded.
20223 F. Supp. at 82.
The court placed heavy reliance on Sims v. United States of America
War Shipping Administration, 186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
816 (1951), in which consequential damages were included in a recovery
for maintenance and cure. In Sims the shipowner's good faith did not save
him from liability; the court drawing an analogy to tort law in which
a wrongdoer hurts another in an accident but fails to provide medical
care or to alleviate the harm honestly thinking that (1) he was not
himself negligent or (2) the victim was contributorily negligent. If
the trier of facts disagrees with the actor on these conclusions, the
defendant is liable for full damages suffered, although some of them
could have been mitigated by prompt action of his part.
Id. at 974, 975.
However, in Sims the consequential damages from the withholding of the
maintenance and cure were physical as a prolongation of the seaman's illness and no mention was made of monetary damages in the form of counsel
fees. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Vaughan did not cite
the Sins opinion or use the phrase 'consequential damages.' Nevertheless,
the Jordan court felt that counsel fees had been brought within the sphere
of consequential damages in maintenance and cure action. 223 F. Supp. at

83.

1967]

MAINTENANCE AND CURE COUNSEL FEES

479

Apparently the Supreme Court intended to put shipowners
on notice that if, in any case, they saw fit to contest a claim for
maintenance and cure, regardless of the reasonableness of the
grounds upon which the refusal to pay is based, and if it was
ultimately determined on the merits that maintenance and cure
was indeed owing, then counsel fees should be paid as compensation for 'necessary expenses' incurred. In other words, attorney's
fees have been made a routine element of damages to be paid
any seaman who wins a contested maintenance and cure suit.
Apparently this added and unusual onus is put on the shipowners' shoulders in maintenance and cure actions in an attempt
to equalize the always poor and usually ignorant seaman with
the powerful, wealthy, and well-informed shipping company which
is better able to evaluate the legal merits of a claim and to pay
the, to them, relatively small
amounts usually involved in mainte28
nance and cure actions.
In the Gore case, the court did not require a finding of recalcitrance by the shipowners before counsel fees could be awarded."0
There was, however, no express statement that the recovery of counsel fees was treated as an automatic obligation to be placed on a
shipowner in any litigated maintenance and cure claim. In allowing
the seaman to recover counsel fees in one of the actions, the court
did not permit the shipowner to escape liability due to the fact that
he in good faith believed that ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and cure rested with another shipowner." Against another
shipowner counsel fees were awarded with the statement that the
shipowner failed to pay maintenance concurrently with the need."1
In the discussion as to whether secondarily liable shipowners could
recover from primarily liable shipowners counsel fees paid to the
seaman, the court made a strong argument in favor of a liberal
interpretation of Vaughan. Citing the Jordan opinion, the court said
that "the awarding of counsel fees in all these cases is a corollary
of the strong policy of the admiralty law favoring prompt payment
2

1Id.at 83.
"0Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
"' When a seaman leaves any ship after he has become disabled, the ship
that he leaves is responsible for providing maintenance and cure. See, e.g.,
GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-8, at 257 (1957); 1 NoRRis, SEAMAN
§ 568 (2d ed. 1962); ROBINsON, ADMIRALTY § 36, at 292 (1939).
3 Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 104, 116 n.9 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). The court did note that Public Health Service records dearly
indicated the merits of the libellant's claim which could be construed to
raise an inference of bad faith.
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of maintenance claims."
Although there was evidence that ruled
out any contention that the primarily liable shipowner was acting in
bad faith, the court assessed counsel fees as damages under a policy
of encouraging shipowners to pay maintenance claims rapidly, and
discouraging the denial to seamen of just claims for long periods
while competing shipowners, or a court, resolved the issue of ultimate responsibility.3 3 Thus, this court seems to have adopted a very
liberal position in favor of seamen in the awarding of counsel fees
in maintenance and cure cases.
The Supreme Court has not yet clarified its position on this
issue, but the liberal policy considerations lying behind the action
for maintenance and cure3 4 make it seem probable that it will adopt
a rule similar to the language of the Gore opinion. There could
conceivably be a dispute over a maintenance and cure claim where
the shipowner acted with the highest equitable regard toward the
seaman's rights, but the seaman failed to cooperate in an investigation of the merits of the claim. Thus, the obligation on the shipowner to pay counsel fees should not be absolute and automatic in
any contested maintenance and cure action that the shipowner loses.
In such a situation where the equities lie on the side of the shipowner in the parties' attempt to settle prior to the litigation, the shipowner should not be responsible for the seaman's counsel fees. 5
GEORGE

V. HANNA, III

"Id. at 125.
"Id. at 126.
"Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1962) (on remand).
"Allowing the recovery of counsel fees as damages has also raised other
problems. For example, most courts speak of reasonable counsel fees. In
Vaughan, on remand, the district court held that a fifty per cent contingent
fee contract could not be approved. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575
(E.D. Va. 1962). Other courts have allowed fees of thirty-three and onethird per cent of the recovery. See Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Hurte v. Socony-Mobile Oil Co., 221 F. Supp.
885 (E.D. Mo. 1963). However, if counsel fees are to be considered
damages, who should determine the reasonableness? Should a lawyer be
permitted to set his own fee or should it be determined by a judge or jury?
In allowing recovery for reasonable counsel fees in Gore, the court held
that if counsel could not agree on the amount of fee then affidavits should be
filed by each side with the court in support of their claims. The court would
then make a determination. 256 F. Supp. at 127 n.32. In Burkert v.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 350 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1965), the court directed an
award of counsel fees incurred by seaman on his appeal in an amount the
district court thought reasonable. Other problems may well arise if the
policy of allowing counsel fees in maintenance and cure cases is extended to
seamen's actions based on unseaworthiness. See BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF
THE SUPREME COURT

§ 1-7 (1963).

COMPULSORY INSURANCE RATING
Antitrust--Insurance-Compulsory Rating Bureaus
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,1 North Carolina's statutory scheme
requiring all insurance companies selling automobile liability insurance to adhere to state rates initiated by a compulsory rating bureau
was upheld.2 Plaintiffs, five large insurance companies doing twentynine percent of the total business in North Carolina, argued that
because the North Carolina statute restricted competition by prohibiting lower premium rates, the statute had been pre-empted by
the Sherman Acte and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
In 1869 in Paul v. Virginia5 the United States Supreme Court
held that the business of insurance was not commerce and subsequent decisions were consistent with this holding. Thus, insurance
was not subject to congressional control under the commerce clause
and consequently, the states regulated and taxed the business.' But
in United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n,7 where there
was concerted action and an agreement which fixed rates and commissions of agents, boycotts to coerce non-members to join
-361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
'For the entire scheme, see N.C. GN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to -248.8 (1965),
as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248 (Supp. 1965). Specific provisions under attack in the principal case are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-247 (1965) (membership in a bureau a prerequisite to writing automobile liability insurance)
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1965) (forbidding issuance of rates not
in conformity with rates made and filed by the rating bureau, but allowing
for the charging of a higher rate if such rate is charged with the knowledge and written consent of both the insured and the Commissioner). Other
significant sections are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248 (Supp. 1965) (providing
for approval or disapproval of the proposed rates from the compulsory bureau
by the insurance commissioner within ninety days after submission) and
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1957) (requiring automobile liability
insurance as a prerequisite to registration).
826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
'59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Later cases were New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648 (1895). See generally SAwYER, IN SURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1945), [hereinafter cited as SAwYER]; Powell, Insurance as Coinmerce, 57 HARv. L. Rnv. 937 (1944).
'Although in 1944 there was state statutory regulation of rate-making
in two-thirds of the states, private rate-making was not really effectively
controlled. Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Inisurance Regulation:
The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56 Mica. L. REv.
545, 546-52 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kimball & Boyce]. See also
SAWYER at 38-40.
'322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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S.E.U.A., and control of ninety per cent of fire and "allied" lines,
the United States Supreme Court held that insurance was subject
to federal control under the commerce clause, noting that: "No
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across
state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance."" However, the court found
a more flexible conception of federal-state relationship than was
present in Paul v. Virginia because the federal regulation (the Sherman Act) did not exclude state regulation? The court said: "The
argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many states
laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go
so far as to permit private insurance companies, without state super10
vision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates."
Nevertheless, many feared that the foundations of state regulatory and taxing systems had been shaken, 1 notwithstanding a statement to the contrary by Attorney General Biddle. 2 Specifically, insurance men feared that state regulation that permitted rate-making
would be declared invalid because in conflict with the Sherman Act;
and state officials feared the invalidity of taxes as a burden on interstate commerce.'3 This fear was ill-founded because Gibbons v.
OgdenI'4 had held that state regulation of interstate activities was
not proscribed by the commerce clause standing alone, but only when
Congress had acted pursuant to the commerce clause. But much
confusion was evident about the status of insurance regulation and
insurance companies pressed for congressional legislation that would
exempt insurance from federal antitrust laws and authorize continued state regulation.
8

Id. at 553.
44 CoLum. L. REv. 772, 777 (1944).
' See Note, at
562.
10 322 U.S.
REv. 1088 (1962).
"See Note, 46 MINN. L. A3360
(1944).
12 90 CONG. REc. A3359,
IS See Kimball & Boyce at 553-54. For the specific reasons given by
insurance people that state laws should remain effective, see Dirlam &
Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of Regulated Competition, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 199, 201-02 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Dirlam & Stelzer].
1,22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Later, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that as long as Congress had not pre-empted a field, the states were
free to regulate. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). The
Robertson case upheld state regulation of unadmitted insurers and unlicensed
agents. The court held that state power to regulate insurance did not depend
on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
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To clarify matters and to insure the existence of state laws
which regulate insurance, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 5 a compromise between those who wanted Congress explicitly
to overrule the South-Eastern decision and those who felt that Congress and the states could adjust to the situation with appropriate
legislation. 6 Clearly, the purpose of the act was to plot the boundaries between state and federal regulation of insurance.'7 Its stated
purpose was that the "continued regulation and taxation by the
several states of the business of insurance is in the public interest . . ."" and, therefore, insurance "shall be subject to the laws of
the several states. . . ."I" A three year moratorium was declared to

20
enable the states to enact legislation regulating insurance.
Sections 2(b) and 3(b) draw the boundary: the former provides that the "Sherman Act ... shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law";"1 the latter provides that "nothing contained in this
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."2 2
Section 3(b) appears to be the result of congressional fears
that the practices revealed in South-Eastern would arise again, although clearly, the Sherman Act would already be applicable under
the South-Eastern decision since no question of state regulation was
present in that case. Justice Black, speaking for the court, said, in
reference to existing state regulation: "No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate and boycott

competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged ....

23

The

language of section 3 (b) appears to incorporate Black's language.
15 See Note, 46 MINN. L. Rv. 1088, 1090 (1962) citing 23 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 317 (1945) for a detailed history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
" See 91 CONG. REc. 1480-81 (1945).
" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 85 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
1s 59 Stat. 33 (1945),
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
" 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1964).
2061 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1964). United States v.
Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956) held that the Sherman
Act2161
was Stat.
applicable
during the
moratorium.
448 (1947),
15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1964).
22 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1964). There is no lack of
precedent for this "exemption" from antitrust. For a listing of statutory
exemptions from federal antitrust laws, see PHILLIPS, PEaSPECTIVES ON
ANTITRUST POLIcY 301-11 (1965).
23

322 U.S. at 562.
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Any attempt to apply the Sherman Act to the business of insurance
must, therefore, be justified by the absence of state regulation or
the existence of abuses enumerated in 3(b).
In the principal case the plaintiffs did not argue that the Sherman Act had been violated by North Carolina or that the state
had not regulated the business of insurance, but that the North
Carolina regulatory scheme had been pre-empted by section 3 (b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The reason for this argument is clear.
In Parkerv. Brown the United States Supreme Court said:
We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate
program, [the regulatory scheme in question], would violate the
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by
virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons,
individual or corporate ....

The state in adopting and enforcing

the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered
into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly

but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
24
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit
Specifically, this has been interpreted to mean that the Sherman Act
does not apply to state regulation of insurance. 5 Thus, plaintiffs
argued that Parkercould be distinguished from the principal case in
that, while in Parkerthere was an attempted application of antitrust
laws to the state activity in question, here was a pre-emption of state
law because of a violation of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2" In other words, section 3(b) denotes a limitation on
the Parker v. Brown doctrine by making the Sherman Act pre-emi-

nent in areas of boycotts, coercions, intimidations, even where the
state had regulated.
Whether there has been a pre-emption depends upon congressional intent. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that section 2(b) stand" 317 U.S. 341, 350, 352 (1943).

"See, e.g., Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299
(D. Mass. 1957), aff'd 2nein., 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 828 (1957); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal
Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950); Insurance Co. of North America

v. Insurance Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 116 So. 2d 224 (1959).

"8(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs further noted that the regulation in
Parker actually conformed to the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of
1937 and the dispute was therefore between two federal statutes; thus, the
case did not involve a federal-state conflict as is present in the principal
case. Brief for Appellants, pp. 34-38, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d
870 (4th Cir. 1966).
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ing alone would give states carte blanche to regulate without fear
of federal antitrust application. But section 2(b) is limited by section 3(b) which asserts the supremacy of the Sherman Act where
there is "coerced" restraint of trade, whether private or state, because unless this is so, the langauge of the act is redundant since
antitrust legislation is already applicable under section 2(b) to the
extent the state has not undertaken regulation. Thus, section 3 (b)
denotes something further, pre-emption of state laws which establish "coercion" in restraint of trade.17 North Carolina contended
that the two sections do not conflict; state regulation operates as a
substitute for the Sherman Act, except that it is always applicable
to private boycott, coercion, etc., not to "state coercion" because
Congress did not intend to create a new area of Sherman Act application beyond Parkerv. Brown.2
The court in the principal case rejected plaintiffs argument:
2 Evidences of this congressional intent are the following:
I take it that the Senator is apprehensive lest a statute by a State
attempting to give validity to a private agreement to regulate would
be recognized under [Parker v. Brown] .

.

. I have no doubt in my

own mind that no State... could give authority to violate the Sherman antitrust law.
91 CONG. REc. 1480 (1945).
Nothing in this bill is to be so construed as indicating it to be the
intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several
States to enact legislation that would make it compulsory for any
Insurance company to become a member of rating bureaus or charge
uniform rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive rates
on a sound financial basis are in the public interest.
H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
Plaintiffs also point out that Congress did not establish compulsory
rating bureaus for the District of Columbia. Brief for Appellants, pp. 26-27,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966). For the general
argument of the plaintiffs, see Bergson, Regulation v. Competition, 1956 INs.
LJ 703, 706-07.
"8Evidences of this congressional intent are the following: "The antitrust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the
States such as agreed insurance rates if they are affirmatively approved by
State officials." 91 CONG. REc. 1479 (1945) (President Roosevelt writing
to Senator Radcliffe, quoted by Senator Pepper).
A state law relating to taxation, a law relating to regulation, for
insurance, the fixing of rates, or the fixing of the terms of a contract
of insurance, which might under some definition of monopoly be
monopolistic, would be permitted under the pending bill; but if the
State undertook to authorize a boycott, a coercion, or an intimidation, or an agreement to do any one of those three things, then it
would be clearly void....
91 CONG. REc. 480-81 (1945) (remarks by Senator Ferguson). Thus, it
appears that North Carolina makes no distinction between private and compulsory bureaus, arguing that Congress intended to allow the states this
discretion, whether or not such later practice might actually be monopolistic.
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[W]e find no merit in the distinction suggested by appellants
between the injunction sought in Parkerv. Brown and the declaration of pre-emption sought here. The central question in both
cases is whether a program of regulation established and actively
supervised by a state is subject to the antitrust laws. Absent
v. Brown,
congressional action departing from the rule of Parker
29
the North Carolina statutory plan is clearly valid.
The court concluded that nothing in the McCarran-Ferguson Act
or its history suggest a limitation of Parker, that there was no
delegation of sovereign authority to a private group or authorization of violations of antitrust laws, and that the purpose of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was to give full support to then existing
and future systems of regulation.
While the court is correct in holding Parker indistinguishable
from the principal case to the extent that the result hoped to be
reached in both was to make state regulation ineffective, it does not
answer plaintiff's arguments. For example, the court referred to
Senator Ferguson to the effect that a state could institute a rating
bureau, but the question is not a rating bureau per se, but whether
the state can have a compulsory rating bureau with standard rates
allowing no deviation in view of section 3(b). Clearly, Congress
intended to allow state established rating bureaus and to permit
voluntary rate-making among insurance companies. Thus, under the
act, insurance companies can voluntarily join together and agree
upon rates as long as there is no section 3(b) violation and the
state has regulated. 0 Further, subsequent to the McCarran-Ferguson Act a large number of the states enacted congressionally approved "all-industry" bills, which provided for non-compulsory
rating bureaus subject to commissioner approval of rates.3
Perhaps the court was terse because of the more detailed holding of the district court, but the district court misunderstood plaintiffs argument, thinking the suit was an attempted application of
antitrust laws to a state."2 Actually, plaintiffs could have argued that
361 F.2d at 872.
See notes 27-28 supra.
See Donovan, Insurance-The Case in Favor of Existing Exemptions
from the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. BJ. 56, 59-64 (1960). See generally
ZOFF.R, THE HITsRo
OF AUTOMOBILE Iws RANcE RATING (1959) [hereinafter cited as ZoFFER].

"The court said: "In effect, the plaintiffs insist the State has committed
a violation of the Sherman Act by establishing such stringent controls upon
the business of insurance as to foreclose competition. They insist the state
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North Carolina had not come up to the level of regulation required
to oust federal laws on the grounds that the regulation in question
served no function except to permit anti-competitive activities under
the guise of state control. However, this attack under section 2(b)
would be difficult to prove and would be subject to the Parker
malady already pointed out, i.e., the Sherman Act does not apply to
activities which are controlled and regulated by the state.33 Further,
the courts have shown a reluctance to distinguish between effective
and ineffective regulation. 4
The principal case appears to be the first time this pre-emption
argument has been made. The case is significant because it shows
again the problems the courts have in applying the McCarran-Ferguson Act to situations where there is state regulation. The problem is
two-fold: whether regulation under section 2(b) is sufficient to oust
federal laws, and whether state regulation is still valid in light of
the argued pre-emption of section 3(b). The implicit problem is
whether state regulation that is ineffective or actually conducive to
anti-competitive practices is sufficient to oust federal laws which
attempt to maintain competition.
For example, in North Little Rock Trans. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch. 5 the court found that Arkansas had regulated within
the meaning of the act so that federal antitrust laws were not applicable. Here, private rate-making was effective unless affirmatively
disapproved of by the state insurance department. Although evidence of this practice does not of itself show that it was anti-competitive, plaintiffs were not permitted to present evidence that such
was the effect of the regulation."6 It has further been held that
even if a monopoly existed otherwise, if a state regulated, then this
was permissible. In Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,3 7

insurance companies and members of the State Employees' Group
Insurance Commission joined and procured an award of an insuris overcontroling the business of insurance." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,

242 F. Supp. 73, 83 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
" The United States as amicus curiae in the district court insisted the
state had failed to come up to the standard of regulation required by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 83. Clearly, this argument comes under
section 2(b) of the act. The United States did not join this appeal.
" See text following.
"North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 181 F.2d
174 (8th Cir. 1950).
*For a criticism of this case, see Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160 (1951).
3 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957).
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ance contract for employees of Massachusetts. The result was that
ninety-five percent of the insurance was allotted to these companies
while the low bid was rejected by the state. Other decisions seem
also to disregard the effects of state regulation and support the posi38
tion taken by the court in the principal case.
However, there may be some concern over this blanket analy-

sis." In CaliforinaLeague of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co.4 0 the court held that while an agreement among

defendant companies to fix commission rates could not be attacked
under section 2(b) because the state had regulated (i.e., allowed
co-operation among insurance companies, but not an agreement to
adhere), it was intimated by the court that the activity in question
could be attacked under section 3(b). On subsequent amendment
of the complaint, the same court held that such a regulation did not
displace federal antitrust application, even if such a result did render
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "meaningless" in the price fixing area.4 '
"In a situation analogous to the principal case, a compulsory rating
bureau which allowed no deviation in rates was upheld. The court relied
on Parker and applied the "principle" to the state activity. However, the
argument presented in this case was not pre-emption, but was an attempted
application of antitrust laws. Insurance Co. of North America v. Insurance
Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 116 So. 2d 224 (1959). Where a state law proscribed unfair insurance advertising and authorized a scheme of enforcement, the United States Supreme Court has held that nothing in the McCarran-Ferguson Act supports the argument that there is a distinction between
regulation and legislation; the legislation in question, even though the argument was made that the statute had not been crystallized into effective
administrative procedures for application to the individual case, was sufficient
regulation. F.T.C. v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam),
affirming 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957).
" In 1959 congressional hearings on this problem, seven senators of a
subcommittee investingating antitrust matters concluded:
It is clear that section 3(b) means that State regulation under . . .
[the McCarran-Ferguson Act] may not abridge the protection from
coercion, boycott, or intimidation afforded by the Sherman Act. The
requirement of several State statutes for mandatory bureau membership substantially lessens competition and appears to be in conflict with
the McCarran Act.... The McCarran Act can certainly not be viewed
as justifying the acts of States in compelling all insurers to be members of rating bureaus or requiring that all rates be uniform by
legislative fiat.
S. REP. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 77 (1961). North Carolina's bureau
was singled out as clearly reprehensible to the sentiments of the subcommittee and it was suggested by the subcommittee that the Attorney General
bring an action to test the validity of the bureau.
"175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
't California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
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Other cases have also shown concern over this problem and allowed
antitrust application. 42
Particularly relevant is the language the court used in Monarch
Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. 43 where the court
had found that the state had "regulated": "In passing the McCarran Act, Congress was attempting to return primary responsibility
for insurance regulation to the states; only when a state has not
acted, would federal legislation become effective. Section 3(b), on
the other hand, was designed to exempt certain types of cases from
this general pattern of deference to state regulation; where boycotts,
or agreements to boycott were concerned, the federal policy expressed
through the Sherman Act to be preeminent."44
Rate-making has the dual function of insuring adequacy of the
insurance fund (to pay for the obligations of the insurance policy)
and fairness of premium charges.4 5 North Carolina's scheme fulfills
the former by practically insuring solvency of the insurance companies. But the motorist perhaps pays higher for this protection
than he should. It must be noted that this higher rate does not
mean North Carolina rates are higher than rates in other states, but
that rates perhaps could be lower in North Carolina if the compulsory aspect of the regulation were removed. It is common knowledge that rates in North Carolina are lower than surrounding states
and the nation." It may be argued that one factor causing this
lower rate is the fact that jury verdicts of automobile negligence
suits in North Carolina are lower than in states with more urban
population. Moreover, the rates filed are based on pooled loss experience and the rate agreed upon is likely to protect the less efficient
State regulation that attempted to regulate the insurance companies
extraterritorial activities was considered insufficient to oust federal jurisdiction. FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960), on remand,
298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962). Even though regulation of title insurance
was of the same nature as a particular provision of federal law, this was
not sufficient to oust federal regulation which prevented one title company
from purchasing stock of another title company in order to control the
market. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.
IIl. 1965).
" 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1963).
"Id. at 844 (dictum).
Kimball & Boyce at 545-46.
'8 The national average for minimum 5/10/5 liability coverage was
$69.70 and North Carolina's average was $50.50 in 1965. South Carolina's
was $58.69 and Tennessee's was $49.92. Many states were well above the
national average. North Carolina Ass'n of Ins. Agents Memo, Feb. 1965,
on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
,42
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member.' This means that the public cannot chose individual coverage, but must take "average" coverage through "average" prices or
rates.
As far as the insurance companies themselves are concerned,
they are severely limited in competing, even though they can make
dividend returns and give better service." And the argument has
long been made that where there is strong state regulation as here,
there is a tendency to have rates entangled with politics." Nevertheless, in some ways the insurance companies collectively benefit.
The scheme, which includes compulsory liability insurance, creates
greater demand and this, in theory, promotes growth. But if there
is greater demand, there are also factors generating greater costtendency toward more claims, the assigned risk plan,5" and greater
administrative costs because of complying with the regulations.
Thus, if these factors are present, then all, not only some, of the
insurance companies should share in this burden, i.e., by pooling
possible losses with the requirement of strict uniformity in rates. 51
Whether North Carolina's plan is of more benefit to the insured
than to the insurer is not readily discernible, but it can safely be
said that the plan does not effectively promote a significant level of
competition. The best result would be one that protects the policyholder while allowing a healthy degree of competition among the

"7See HENSLEY, COMPET TION, REGULATION AND TEE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as HENSLEY]. For the
theory of rate-making, see ZOFFER 4-5. For the mechanics of rate-making,
see CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SocIETY, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE MAKING

(1961).

8However, this form of competition is largely ineffective because dividend rates are uncertain, the buyer loses the use of his money during the
period between premium and dividend, and the seller dislikes this method
because it means increased costs. HENSLEY at 96. For an analysis of these

ways of competing, see O'CONNOR & DAUER, AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
COMPETITIVE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS

(1961).

" Although most states have financial responsibility laws, only three states
have compulsory liability insurance as a prerequisite to registration: Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § IA (Supp. 1965) and MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-J (1954); New York, VEHICL.E AND TRAFFIC LAW
§ 312 (1960); North Carolina,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1957). Of
these states, North Carolina and Massachusetts have laws requiring no
deviations from set rates. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 82
(E.D.N.C. 1965). Texas also prohibits deviation. Ibid.
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-276 (1953) provides for an "equitable apportionment among such insurance carriers." Assigned risk is the granting of
insurance to those who otherwise would be uninsurable or whose rates

be higher.
would
81 See S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1961).
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insurers.52 Alternatives to the plan in question seem closer to this
goal. For example, if rate deviation were allowed, competition
would be enhanced. 53 Solvency requirements could be established for
entry into the market to insure enough reserves for policy coverage." Assuming the argument that rating bureaus are necessary in
the nonlife field is still maintainable (life insurance companies have
legally established mortality tables to determine rates), the question
is whether compulsory bureaus are necessary.5 5 Most states have
non-compulsory bureaus and allow for deviation in rates. 6 And if
in fact such deviation still protects the solvency of the insurers and
does indeed promote competition, then the argument for non-compulsory bureaus is persuasive.5 7 Even in this situation, insurance
companies are protected against rising costs because the market place
would provide for higher rates. Of course, scrutiny of this higher
price seems to be in the public interest. Whatever the alternatives
may, be, if insurance is to be regulated in regard to rates and solvency, this should not be support for broad exemptions from laws
such as the Sherman Act which attempt to maintain competition.
Although the primary purpose of Congress was to return responsibility of insurance regulation to the states, the McCarranFerguson Act expresses a congressional intention to keep the Sherman Act applicable. The real question is whether the federal policy
of competition promoted by the Sherman Act outweighs the policy
of allowing wide discretion by the states in their choice of devices to
regulate insurance. And viewed in this light, the court's decision is
perhaps all that one could expect since courts have generally shown a
" See Michels, Insurance-The Case Against Broad Exemptions From
the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 66, at 72-73 (1960); Dirlam & Stelzer at
211-15.
" The North Carolina plan did allow for deviation in rates until the law
was amended in 1961 by the present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1965).
"' See HENsLEY 38-66.
" Contra, Brook, Public Interest and The Commissioners, 15 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 606 (1950).
"The majority of states permit independent filing of rates; other states
provide that companies must affiliate with a bureau and attempt to compete.
See HENsLEY 97. The bureaus spoken of are usually national, such as the

National Association of Independent Insurers, and provide the necessary
information for the setting of rates. See ZOFFER 72-73. For a listing of
states that have compulsory bureaus and standard rates set by the states in

regard to all fields of insurance, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp.
73, 82 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
"For an analysis of how effective rate-making is in the various states,
see S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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reluctance to allow federal "interference" with state regulation, the
underlying thought being that insurance is still basically a matter for
local regulation. Since Congress created uncertainties under the
act, Congress should remedy them.
WALLACE C. TYSER, JR.
Civil Procedure-Discovery of Liability Insurance
In the recent case of Cook v. Welty,1 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff, in an
action brought to recover damages for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident, should be granted discovery by deposition or interrogatories of the existence and coverage of defendant's
liability insurance.'
Federal courts, and state courts that have procedural rules similar
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are almost evenly divided
on whether automobile liability insurance is discoverable. This problem is relevant in North Carolina because a new code of civil procedure has been proposed by the General Statutes Commission and3
will be considered by the 1967 North Carolina General Assembly.
Deposition and discovery under the Federal Rules are encompassed by Rules 26 to 37:4 Rule 26(b) delimits the scope of this
discovery.' It provides:
'253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
2Id. at 878.
* GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1966), [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES.] The
Proposed Rules are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
correspond numerically to rules of the Federal Rules.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
'Whether discovery is by deposition (FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30), interrogatories (FED. R. CIv. P. 33), or by production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, or photographing (FED. R. Civ. P. 34), Rule 26(b)
delimits the scope of examination both in the Federal Rules and the Proposed
Rules for North Carolina. FED. R. Civ. P. 33-34 provide:
[RULE 33] Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be
inquired into under Rule 26(b)....
[RULE 34] the court . . . may . . . order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying . . . of any . . . docu-

ments . . . which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the matters within the scope of examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) ....
Welty involved a motion to compel defendant to respond to questions
asked while taking a deposition. It was stipulated by the parties that the
issue would also arise if interrogatories covering the same subject matter
had been served.
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(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action ....

It is

not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Almost all decisions, in determining whether liability insurance
is within the scope of Rule 26(b), turn on whether insurance is
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). PROPOSED RULE 26(b) is a copy of FEDERAL
RuLE 26(b) with the following addition:
nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which testimony is sought. But the deponent
shall not be required to produce or submit for inspection any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial unless the judge otherwise orders on the ground that a denial of
production or inspection will result in an injustice or undue hardship;
but, in no event shall the deponent be required to produce or submit
for inspection any part of a writing which reflects an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, or except
as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (d), allow the court to limit or terminate discovery
in order to protect the parties and deponents. They provide:
(b). Orders for the Protectionof Partiesand Deponents. After notice

is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and
upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action
is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or
that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that
stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that
the scope of examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that
the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed
the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that
secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or
that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by
the court; or the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
(d). Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination. At any time during

the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent
and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad
faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition is being taken
may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith
from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the
taking of the deposition as provided in subdivision (b).
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relevant to the subject matter.7 The courts that allow this discovery
use three basic approaches.
(1) Some simply state that insurance is relevant to the subject
matter.' They hold that the test of relevancy at discovery is not
whether the information sought is admissible in evidence or is
relevant to the precise issues in the case, but whether the information is relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.9 In
effect, these courts hold subject matter to include anything that wil
be helpful in preparing the case.' 0
However, this interpretation of relevancy does not seem valid in
light of the history of Rule 26(b). In 1946, it was amended to add:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 1 In the
Committee Note of 1946 to amended subdivision (b), it is stated:
The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the
names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party
in the preparation or presentation of his case. .

.

. In such a

preliminary inquiry admissibility at trial should not be the test as
to whether the information sought is within the scope of proper
examination. .

.

. Of course, matters entirely without bearing

either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within
the scope of the inquiry ....1
Thus, the test of relevancy to the subject matter contemplates
discovery either to obtain evidence to be introduced at the trial, or
to secure information as to where such evidence may be found.
While liability insurance is admissible as evidence in certain situa'There are apparently no courts that consider whether insurance is
privileged. Historically, there are three types of privilege recognized as a

defense to discovery: privilege against self-incrimination, professional privi-

lege, and privilege against making disclosures which would be injurious to
the public interest. See Note, 34 NOTRE DiE LAw 78, 80 (1958). This
Note expresses the view that in this historical context, automobile liability

insurance is not privileged.

'See, e.g., Hurley v. Schmid, 37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965); Furumizo v.
United States, 33 F.R.D. 18 (D. Hawaii 1963); Johanek v. Aberle, 27
F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Mont. 1961); Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.
Tenn. 1951); Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
0Ibid.
10 See, Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
11

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(b).

"' UNITED STATES SUPREmE CouRT,FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

65-6 (rev. ed. 1947).
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13

it generally can neither be admitted as evidence nor be men14
tioned in front of a jury.
Many courts hold that under the guidelines of the committee
note above, insurance is irrelevant and not discoverable. 5 Although
this conclusion seems valid, it is ignored by many courts. In Welty,
for example, after recognizing that as a matter of strict logic insurance is irrelevant, the court dismissed this as too narrow a view. 6
In the case of Orgel v. McCurdy,17 the court simply held that insurance may be generally relevant to the issues in the case.18 However,
it seems the valid test is whether it is relevant, not that perchance it
may be relevant. 9
(2) Other courts hold that insurance is relevant to the subject
matter because plaintiff has a discoverable interest in the policy. ° In

Maddox v. Grauman,2 ' the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that the standard liability policy evidences a contract that inures to
" See, e.g., Plyler v. Gordon, 25 F.R.D. 170 (D.N.J. 1960), where insurance could be used to show defendant was an independent contractor and
thus not covered by the workman's compensation law; Layton v. Cregan &
Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933), where a liability policy
could be used to establish ownership of the vehicle; Modem Elec. Co. v.
Dennis, 259 N.C. 354, 130 S.E.2d 547 (1963); Isley v. Winfrey, 221 N.C.
33, 18 S.E.2d 702 (1942); Davis v. North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., 180
N.C. 74, 104 S.E. 82(1920).
" See, e.g., Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726 (1927);
Lylton v. Marion Mfg. Co., 157 N.C. 331, 72 S.E. 1055 (1911). While
upholding the general rule that liability insurance is inadmissible as evidence,
dicta in Welty states that perhaps the time has come to change this rule.
253 F. Supp. at 878-79. The rationale is that most states now have compulsory automobile insurance and most jurors will assume that defendant
has insurance.
" See, Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Cooper v.
Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D.
159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962);
McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Flynn v. Williams,
30 F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill.
1958); Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958); McNelley v.
Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964).
16253 F. Supp. at 876-77.
8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
8
Id. at 586. While there is an indication that insurance was relevant
in Orget because there was a question of control of the vehicle, many cases
use Orget as authority where there is no issue of control. See, e.g., Brackett
v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
19 DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958).
2
Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Brackett v.
Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Pettie v.
Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
21265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
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the benefit of every person who may be negligently injured by the
assured as completely as if such injured person had been named in
the policy. This is because if there is judgment against the defendant and he does not pay, then plaintiff can go against the insurance
company. The court concludes:
If the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter
after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while the action
pends? We believe it is. An insurance contract is no longer a
secret, private, confidential arrangement between the insurance
carrier and the individual but is an agreement that embraces those
or property may be injured by the negligent act of
whose person
22
the insured.

In Welty the court extends this argument. It says that where
liability insurance is present, the insurance carrier takes over the
defense of the action and furnishes counsel to the defendant as well
as investigating facilities. Thus, it concludes that insurance should
23
be discoverable so that plaintiff can know his real foe.
Those courts denying that there is a discoverable interest point
out that before plaintiff has any rights against an insurance company, he must first recover a judgment against defendant. Therefore, as no enforceable claim accrues against the insurer until
judgment against the insured becomes final, plaintiff has no rights
under the policy at the discovery stage.2 4
In Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hopkins,"5 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that plaintiff could examine the policies but
that the policy amounts should be left off. This result would seem to
answer the arguments of Maddox and Welty. A plaintiff would be
able to determine his real foe as well as the rights and obligations
of the insurer without reference to the amount of coverage provided."
(3) The third ground on which courts hold insurance relevant
and thus discoverable is that such revelation will lead to negotiations
"Id. at 942.
" 253 F. Supp. at 877.
" See, Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Superior

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) (dissent).
See also, 2 WILLIsTON, CoNTRAcrs § 403 at 1091 (3d ed. 1959). The courts

holding that there is a discoverable interest seem to overlook the highly technical nature of a true third party beneficiary contract.
105 N.H. 231, 196 A.2d 66 (1963).
"Id.
at 234, 196 A.2d at 68.
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and settlement." Welty rests its decision predominantly on the need
for settlement. The court explains that dockets are crowded and
accidents on the increase. If a number of cases cannot be settled out
of court, there will be congestion and the number of courts will
have to be greatly increased. The court feels that information concerning liability insurance and its limits is conducive to fair negotiations. It states, for example, that in cases where injuries are great
and insurance coverage low, the plaintiff might well be led to accept
a smaller settlement than the extent of the injuries would otherwise
warrant.28 Other courts hold that the mandate of Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure29 requires a construction of Rule
26(b) that will lead to speedy determination of actions by way of
settlement.8 0
Many courts, however, deny that the interest in settlements
makes liability insurance relevant to the subject matter. They feel
that the fact that courts are congested has no bearing on the fundamental rights of a defendant to have his day in court.8 ' They also
assert that the opposite of the large injury-low insurance argument
is equally valid. If there is a small injury or plaintiff has a weak
case, his discovery that defendant has high insurance limits might
82
result in greater demands by the plaintiff.
In answer to the argument that, in light of Rule 1, Rule 26(b)
should encompass discovery of insurance, some argue that while
compromise may be a by-product of discovery, the true goal of discovery and the Federal Rules is adjudication of the merits."8
" See, Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Hill v. Greer,
30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Mont. 1961); Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Ala. 1964).
" 253 F. Supp. at 877.

" "These rules .

.

. shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
"0E.g., Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Hill v. Greer,
30 F.R.D.
64 (D.N.J. 1961).
"1E.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
2 See, Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962), where the court also
advances a test that if liability is admitted and damages are high, defendant
should reveal his insurance. But if liability is hotly contested, he should not.
" See, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), where
Mr. justice Black states that "if rules of procedure work as they should in
an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should as
nearly possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits." Id. at 373. Contra, Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64

(D.N.J. 1961).
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In addition to these arguments, a few courts have held that
relevation of defendant's insurance at discovery violates his fifth
amendment constitutional rights. 4 The argument is that insurance
is an asset of defendant and that if discovery is allowed, there is no
rational basis to deny discovery as to all of defendant's assets before
liability is established. 35 Thus, Hillman v. Penny,36 a Tennessee
federal case, expressed the fear that a groundless claim might become the vehicle for making full inquiry into all the confidential
affairs of any defendant involved in an automobile accident.3 7
The arguments for relevancy of insurance as illustrated by Welty
thus seem to be answered both by the purpose of discovery, i.e., to
get to the merits, and the limitations on discovery, i.e., to matters of
evidence or matters that may lead to evidence. Nevertheless, the
courts are almost evenly divided on this question. As a number of
courts seem to disregard the purpose and language of Rule 26(b),
an amendment or a definitive decision by the United States Supreme
Court would seem desirable in order to have uniformity throughout
the federal system. When the North Carolina General Assembly
considers Rule 26(b), it specifically should either include or exclude
liability insurance from discovery.
EUGENE W.

PURDOM

Civil Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private
Club Exemption
In United States v. Northwest La. Restaurant Club1 a threejudge federal court held that the acts and practices of the members
of defendant club constituted an unlawful deprivation of rights
secured to Negro citizens for the free and equal use and enjoyment
of public accommodations guaranteed by Title II of the Civil Rights
" Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 287 (E.D. Ill.
1958). For a thorough

discussion of the constitutional problem see Note, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW.
78 (1958).
" See, Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Gallimore
v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Contra, Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12
F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), which holds that a liability policy is not an
asset but purchase protection for both compensatory and punitive damages.
29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"lId.at 161.

'256 F. Supp. 151 (1966).
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Act of 1964.2 In an attempt to avail themselves of the exemption of
"a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public," '3 the members, some one hundred restaurants, had formed a
non-profit corporation named the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club. An action, seeking a permanent injunction against
further discrimination, was brought by the Attorney General of the
United States under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5.4 The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law.5
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first federal government
effort at prohibition of discrimination as to race since the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.' The earlier act had been declared unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases because it attempted to base on
the fourteenth amendment its power to restrict discrimination by
individuals. The new act has survived the test of constitutionality.
Its provision for relief against state actions is supported by the long
line of cases holding that Congress possesses such power under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Its source of authority
2 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964).
*78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964).
*78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1964) provides that
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that
any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the
Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district
court ....

78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(b) (1964) requires the Attorney General
to certify that he feels that the case is of general public importance.
'256 F. Supp. at 151.
'18 Stat. 335 (1875).
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The public accommodations section of the act of
1875 was applicable to individual offenders and was not dependent upon
state action, which led to its destruction. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83

U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873), had held that the purpose of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment was to protect individuals from dis-

crimination by state, not individual, action. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a

strong dissent in The Civil Rights Cases.
878 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)

(1964)

provides that each of the

named establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation if it is "supported by state action."
'E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The scope of the
authority within the prohibition of discrimination supported by state action
is wide. Peripheral types of state activity have been brought within the
sphere of state action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement by state court of a covenant banning sale of real property to Negroes
is state action); see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (lessee of state-owned property is bound by the fourteenth
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for the provision against discrimination by individuals is the commerce clause of the constitution."0 Two cases" have supported its
constitutionality on this theory.
The private establishment exemption provides that "the provisions of . . . [the act] shall not apply to a private club or other

establishment not in fact open to the public .. ."" The act does
not articulate the reason for this exemption, but most certainly it
must rest upon traditional notions of the rights of association and
privacy. 18 Predictably, restaurants and other establishments, whose
prior activities would constitute illegal discrimination under the new
law, seized upon the exemption and attempted to create "private"
clubs in order to avoid the necessity of compliance. 4 According
amendment in the conduct of a restaurant on that property) ; see Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (city's control and maintenance of park
devised to city for use of white people only subjects it to restraints of fourteenth amendment); see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (arrest
of Negroes by police after false reports that such Negroes had committed
criminal acts would be sufficient state action.)
"0U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964)
provides that each of the named establishments which serves the public is
a place of public accommodation if its operations "affect commerce."
For arguments that this is an unconstitutional broadening of the commerce powers see Rice, Federal Public-Accomnodations Law: A Dissent,
17 MERCER L. REv. 338 (1966); Note, 16 S.C.L. REv. 646 (1964).
"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(inn, seventy-five per cent of whose customers traveled in interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant, "Ollie's
Barbeque," purchased forty-six per cent of its meat from local supplier
who had procured it from outside the state).
1278 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964). The section concludes with
the statement that the club's facilities may not be restricted if they are available to patrons of "places of public accommodation" as defined in earlier
subsections.
" In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1957), the Court stated,
"This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." And in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), "The first amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.... [W]e have protected
forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members."
" The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1964, p. 1, col. 4:
Many Dixie businessmen, particularly in the big cities, are complying
with the bill. But some are concerned about competition from the
growing number of other establishments shifting to private operation
in a last ditch effort to preserve racial barriers. Besides restaurant
owners, others who have gone 'private' include proprietors of amusement parks, bowling alleys and at least one major hotel.
The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1964, § A, p. 6, col. 4, related that the new
Civil Rights Act brought a "sudden spate" of private clubs. Both of these
newspaper articles refer to events within Mississippi.
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to the court's decision, this is what was attempted by the members
of the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club.
The test provided by the language of the statute for determination of the status of the alleged club is simply that it is "not in fact
open to the public." 15 No detailed or sophisticated standards appear
with which to attack the problem of just what is "in fact" open to
the public3 8 Because of the short time since passage of the act and

the resulting small amount of litigation under it, there has not yet
been a great amount of judicial formulation of the tests that are to
be applied.
Thus, as an aid in determination of the aspects to which
the federal courts are likely to turn in forthcoming litigation,
examination may be made of the following: the legislative history
of the exemption, state court decisions rendered under state public
accommodation laws, and the factors deemed significant in the principal case.
The legislative history of the private club exemption is limited
almost entirely to the Senate discussion surrounding an amendment
to the language in the proposed House of Representatives bill. The
House version read, "bona fide private club."'17 The amendment
changed this language to the way it now appears, viz. "not in fact
open to the public."'" The debate made it clear that this change was
made so as to more accurately reflect the intent of Congress that the
motivation for the establishment of the club is not to be the test;
rather, the question is to be one of fact alone.Y Thus it seems clear
1578 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a(e) (1964).
"6 The Act lists in § 2000a(b) establishments which are "places of public
accommodation." But as Professor Van Alstyne, writing on the Ohio law,
points out, "[I]t is impossible to determine the scope of the private club
exemption by listing types of facilities, for the legitimate exclusiveness of
such clubs is more a function of their internal order than of the activity
which they sponsor." Van Alstyne, Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 688 (1961).
H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1963).
H7
=R78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a(e) (1964).
'o Senator Long, speaking for the amendment:
Its purpose is to make clear that the test of whether a private club...

is exempt from Title II relates to whether it is, in fact, a private club,
or whether it is, in fact, an establishment not open to the public. It
does not relate to whatever purpose or animus the organizers may
have had in mind when they originally brought the organization or
establishment into existence.
110 CONG. RFc. 13697 (1964).
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that according to the manifested intent of the legislators, a club
could be formed primarily so as to exclude Negroes; yet if it is in
fact private, it would not be covered by the act. Regardless of how
one may or may not feel about this as a worthwhile attribute for
an association, such would appear to be in keeping with the courtprotected notions of privacy and right of association.2"
Many states have passed their own public accommodations
laws.2 ' However, it has been the feeling of many that these laws
have proven to be generally ineffective.2 2 This ineffectiveness, plus
the absence of such laws in some states, led to the belief that federal
legislation was needed. Despite this ineffectiveness, state decisions
rendered under these laws are valuable. They provide various factors
that appear to have been significant in determining whether a particular establishment should be exempted as private:
(1) Procedure for obtaining membership. If the evidence is
that white persons are admitted as members with very little formality, e.g., by simply paying a small fee and "signing up," while
Negroes have to present applications (which are seldom if ever approved), doubt is cast upon the contention that the club is in fact
private.23 Lack of genuine qualifications for membership, so that
in practical effect, the only requisite is being white, together with
24
little limitation as to number, has been deemed significant.
(2) Use of the club by persons other than members. If on occasion persons (white) are admitted without any semblance of becom.0 See note 13 supra.
21
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia are apparently the only states that do not have any type of
public accommodations law. For a list of the statutes, see Comment, Public
Accommodations Laws and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 n.9 (1966).
" For the most part, this ineffectiveness rests upon two circumstances:
strict construction and non-use of the state laws. See Comment, 19 U.
MIAM I L. REv. 456, 465 (1965). See also District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953), where the Supreme Court had to decide
whether or not the statute had been repealed by non-use. (Held that it had
not been.)
For a general discussion of state public accommodation laws and the
litigation surrounding their constitutionality see Caldwell, State Public Accommodation Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40
WAsir. L. REv. 841 (1965).
2" See Lackey v. Sacoolas, 411 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963).
",See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d
432 (Sup. Ct. 1955), mwdified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
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ing members, it would appear unlikely that the club is private. Of
course, a genuine club permits its members to allow guests to use
the facilities. But the "guest list" will hardly be permitted to become
so great that the club is, in effect, open to the public.
(3) Control arrangement; the existence or non-existence of a
profit motive; characterof the relationshipamong the members. One
writer26 suggests the following types of questions: Are any of the
policy decisions made by the members, or do they merely agree to
decisions made by an independent manager, owner, or nucleus of
members ?27 Is the club a nonprofit organization, perhaps collecting
dues, or is it in practical essence a commercial enterprise, with
profits going to the manager or owner personally? Do short-term
membership cards functionally resemble tickets?28 Is the principal
sustaining element in the club the members' interest in and association with one another, or does the club exist primarily because of
the common interest in the activity of its sponsors ?29 To what extent are those who use the facilities actually acquainted with one
another?
In most of these state cases several of the above factors are discussed. One factor may seem to predominate, but the decisions are
usually based upon a combination of two or more. Seldom is a broad
or general rule stated. In at least one of the cited cases the reason
for formation of the club was examined." ° However, if legislative
intent is to be given weight, motivation should be of no significance
31
under the federal law.
2 See Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio Ct.
App."6 Van
1950).Alstyne,
Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for
Ohio, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 683, 689 (1961). The questions are posed in a discussion of the then new Ohio public accommodations law.
"'See Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1950).
" See Evans v. Ross, 55 NJ. Super. 266, 150 A.2d 512, 4 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 355 (Camden County Ct. 1959), aff'd, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d
441, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 1012 (Super. Ct. 1959), cert. denied, 31 N.J. 292,
157 A.2d 362, 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 209 (1959).
2 See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432
(Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957);
Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y. Supp. 379
(1926).
o See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d
432 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
" See note 19 supra.
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Turning to the principal case, examination of the court's findings
of fact reveals a reflection only of express dealing with some of the
factors considered in state cases and apparently no dealing with
legislative intent. Indeed, the court seems to have disregarded the
intent of the legislators that motivation is not to be significant, as
it found that the club "was organized and... exists for the purpose
of avoiding the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. " 32 It
is easily understandable that a court would find it difficult to refrain
from attaching significance to motivation. This is especially true
where such a purpose is expressly manifested, as in this case where
the organizers solicited members by representing that the club would
provide a means for circumventing the act. 3 However, this should
be avoided as a test of the "public" or "private" character of the
club.
Procedure for obtaining membership, an important factor in
the state cases, was evidently significant here. This is reflected in
the court's finding that the members "offered and issued membership cards as a matter of course to any white customer without any
requirements or conditions whatsoever. . . ,,14 A consideration of
the use of the club by persons other than members was made when
the court found that the members "served white customers without
regard to whether they were members of the Northwest Louisiana
Restaurant Club. .

. ."

- The nature of the interests of the members

is not mentioned. However, it was found that prior to formation of
the club,3 6 the restaurants were businesses open to the public and
that "the character of its trade and nature of its solicitation to the
general public [of each member restaurant] had not changed by
reason of its membership in the club."' 37 Implicit in this finding is
the fact that the only interest binding the members was avoidance
of having to serve Negroes. Clearly, this is not the associational
interest in one another that the act would seem to contemplate. Relevant here is the finding that the club conducted no general meetings
"256 F. Supp. at 152.
8'Id. at 153.
"Id. at 153.

"Id. at 153.
'The club was found to have been chartered as a corporation on June

30, 1964, only two days before the effective date of the act. Id. at 152.
8TId. at 153
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after July, 1964.38 Hardly can a club be a private association where
the members do not meet together.
It seems apparent that Northwest La. Restaurant Club is a relatively "easy" case, and that the court had little trouble concluding
that the members were not in such a relation that the private club
exemption should be invoked to protect rights of private association.
Such a protectable association did not exist. Because of the ease in
deciding that this was indeed a "sham organization," 9 the court
here simply was not called upon for extensive articulation of the
precise factors that led to the decision.
However, hard cases will come, and more judicial refinement of
the factors considered will be necessary and welcomed. For example,
what will be the decision in regard to the genuinely private club that
grows larger and larger? Will the greater number of members,
many of whom perhaps do not know one another, render the club
so "open.to the public" that it will cease to be exempted? How
would a court hold on a facility, such as a golf course, which ordinarily constitutes a place of public accommodation, but operates as
a "private" club, with associational interests existing among the
members ?40

ROBERT

L.

THOMPSON

Conflict of Laws-Departure from Lex Loci
In Clark v. Clark1 the New Hampshire court applied its own
law and allowed a guest passenger to sue her host for ordinary
negligence rather than applying the stricter Vermont guest statute.
The parties were both from New Hampshire; the automobile accident occurred in Vermont. The decision was a logical extension of
that court's recent holdings in the area of conflicts law. Earlier in
Thompson v. Thompson2 the court abandoned its adherence to
strict lex loci delicti which requires application of the law of the
place of the wrong, overruled a long line of cases, and applied the
3
Id. at 153.
19 Id. at 153.

," Professor Van Alstyne suggests this problem. Van Alstyne, Civil
Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHio ST. L.J.
683, 688 (1961).
, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
-N.H.2 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
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law of New Hampshire when deciding an interspousal tort suit.
They followed Thompson with a consistent holding in Johnson v.
Johnsons by refusing to invoke their own interspousal law when
the litigants were from Massachusetts even though the accident occurred and suit was brought in New Hampshire. In a third case,
Dow v. Larrabee,4 the court held that Massachusetts law should
decide the degree of care necessary in a suit between New Hampshire residents over an auto accident that occurred in Massachusetts.
The holding was based upon a finding that Massachusetts was the
state with the most significant relations.5
Clark v. Clark is the final and complete rejection of traditional
lex loci application. The court candidly explained in Clark that in
their recent holdings they had thought the "mechanical rule ought to
be discarded, but unlike some of the other states . . . [they were]

unwilling to abandon it completely until reasonably sure that a more
satisfactory rule was available to take its place." 6 Now they are
reasonably sure.
New Hampshire follows a small number of states' which have
been persuaded to embark upon what North Carolina Justice Rodman terms an "uncharted sea."" The courses taken have varied
considerably as the courts ventured from the relatively smooth
waters of lex loci delicti.
For example, California in the first case9 to "break the ice"'"
characterized a tort case as a question of "family relationship"
which should be decided by the law of the domicile. Pennsylvania
weighed the relative interests of the states involved in reaching its
decision. 1 Similarly New York applied what it calls the "center of
'107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).

'107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966).
Id. at -, 217 A.2d at 508.
-- N.H. at , 222 A.2d at 207.

' See, Lauritizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Emery v. Emery, 45

Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel,
Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) ; Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105,
768 (1958); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,

Inc., 249
141 A.2d
279, 240
203 A.2d

796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).

Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
oHaumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 134, 95 N.W.2d
814, 816 (1959). The court reviewed many cases but considered California
as the first state to depart from lex loci.
"tGriffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), 43
N.C.L. Ray. 586 (1965).
1
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theory.12

Wisconsin used a three step analysis and optigravity"
mistically predicted a forth-coming "common law of conflicts that
will be administered with uniformity as jurisdictions generally
8
adopt this rule.'
Legal scholars have suggested lists of factors to be considered
in decision making by courts that reject lex loci. An article by Professors Cheatham and Reese sets out nine factors,,4 and Professor
Yotema's scheme embodies seventeen.' 5 The New Hampshire court
in the Clark case relied explicitly upon the five "choice-influencing
considerations" as outlined and elaborated upon in a recent law
review article by Professor Leflar.' 6 Other authorities have written
extensively on the question, invariably urging an abandonment of
lea loci delicti in favor of a decision making process that would
balance the policies and interests of the contact states.' 7 The Restatement (Second), "Conflict of Laws," § 379 (Tent. Draft No.
9 1964) also reflects the current trend and reverses the Restatement's
traditional position.'
In the face of and despite the overwhelming academic mandate
1" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
" Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 633, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (1965).
" Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv.
959 (1952).
' Yotema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B.
REv. 721 (1957).

" Leflar,

Choice-Influencing Considerations in

N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
17

DICEY, CONFLICTS OF LAws (7th ed. 1958)
LAws (3d ed. 1963); Cavers, A Critique of the

;

Conflicts Law,

41

STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF

Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1944); Cheatham &
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 959 (1952); Cook,
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963); Harper, Policy
Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Hill, Governmental Interest and
the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463 (1960); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924);
Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1251 (1963); Traynor, Is This
Conflict Realty Necessary? 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959); Weintraup, A
Method for Solving Conflicts Problens:Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963);
Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37

468 (1928).

18
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934),
the place of the wrong in traditional lex loci fashion.

YALE

L.J.

applies the law of
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and growing acceptance by other courts, North Carolina continues
to reject categorically all assaults upon lex loci.19 The North Carolina court has been criticized in this Review 0 for refusing to alter
its position but, as one case surveyor has observed, evidences no
propensity for change.2 1 Upon viewing the varied results of the
courts which have been blown by "the winds of change"2 and the
result of Clark v. Clark in particular, it is not difficult to understand the court's reluctance. For example, the future decisions of
the New Hampshire court will be based upon "the court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law, as between the
two competing ones."23 Certainly, predictability and consistency are
not lightly to be sacrificed to such open ended discretion.
However, it is clear that in a limited class of cases strict application of lex loci renders results which are not in keeping with established policy and preference as expressed in the substantive law of
North Carolina. The most prominent examples are motor vehicle
cases containing the following common elements: (1) All parties to
the litigation are residents of the forum state. (2) The action results from a tort by one against the other. (3) The commission of
the tort occurred while the parties were in transit, having left the
forum state together and intending to return.
It is submitted that these cases should be excepted from the lex
loci delicti doctrine and that this can be done without a substantial
departure from the present rules. Lex loci was firmly entrenched
in the law before the automobile afforded a cheap, fast, convenient,
but not always safe means of interstate travel. 4 Thus, this factor
was not a primary consideration when formulating tort law in the
area of conflicts. That it has become a consideration demanding
special treatment should not now be denied. This is especially true
See, e.g., Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965) ; Conrad
v. Miller Motor Express, Inc., 265 N.C. 427, 144 S.E.2d 269 (1965) ; Petrea
v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Crow v.
Ballard, 263 N.C. 475, 139 S.E.2d 624 (1965).
0 See 43 N.C.L. REv. 586 (1965); 42 N.C.L. Rlv. 419 (1964).
' 1 Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, N. C. Case Law, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 895, 899
(1965).
22
Ibid.
28 - N.H. at , 222 A.2d at 209.
2" Hipps v. Southern Ry., 177 N.C. 472, 99 S.E. 335 (1919); Harrison
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 168 N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915); Hancock v.
Telegraph Co., 142 N.C. 163, 55 S.E. 82 (1906). Accord, Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
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when the cases are examined in the light of the applicable North
Carolina law.
Two particular situations should be analyzed. First is where a
North Carolina wife is denied an action against her husband in
tort because the law of the place of the wrong would deny a wife
such an action.2 5 Second is where a North Carolina guest is required to show gross rather than ordinary negligence on the part of
his North Carolina host under a guest statute of the lez loci.2" In
the circumstances above North Carolina substantive law would allow
the wife to sue her husband2" and require the guest only to prove
ordinary negligence.2 8 North Carolina's position is based in the first
instance upon a statute favoring a wife, 9 and in the second upon a
continued refusal either by statute or judicial decision to lower a
host's standard of care to his guest.30
Those states which do forbid interspousal suits generally do so
in order to encourage domestic harmony 1 while those requiring a
greater degree of negligence on the part of the host seek to avoid
collusive suits 2 and to discourage ingratitude on the part of the
guest.8 It is clear that these considerations do not influence the
North Carolina court when deciding its own law."4 Neither do they
influence decisions when the court applies the law of another juris" Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965) ;
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Bogen v. Bogen, 219
N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941) ; Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E.

101 (1931).

' Nix v. English, 254 N.C. 414, 119 S.E.2d 220 (1961) ; Baird v. Baird,
223 N.C. 730, 28 S.E.2d 225 (1943); Brumsey v. Mathias, 216 N.C. 743,
6 S.E.2d 495 (1940); Farfour v. Fahad, 214 N.C. 281, 199 S.E. 521 (1938);
Wright v. Pettus, 209 N.C. 732, 184 S.E. 494 (1936); Wise v. Hollowell,

205 N.C. 286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933).

27N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1965); Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142
S.E.2d 638 (1965) ; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
" McGee v. Cox, 267 N.C. 314, 148 S.E.2d 132 (1966); Boykin v.
Bissette, 260 N.C. 295, 132 S.E.2d 616 (1963); Nantz v. Nantz, 255 N.C.
357, 121 S.E.2d 561 (1961).
'
30

See note 27 supra.
See note 28 supra.

" Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Ford,
InterspotsalLiability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws, 15

U. PiTrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
"2Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929) ; Ehrenweig, Guest Statutes
in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).

" This reflects the adage that a dog should not bite the hand that feeds
it. See, e.g., Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn. 188, 175 Atl. 470 (1934).
" See notes 27-28 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[vol. 45

diction since the question then is the law of the loci and not why it
is applied. 5 Therefore, the court is precluded from examining the
status of the litigants or the purpose of the foreign state's law.
The problem is clear. North Carolinians risk the loss of the
liberal protection of their own law when they leave the state in an
automobile either with their husband or as a guest passenger. This
is true although they depart from the state in property licensed by
the state, driven by a driver licensed by the state, covered with insurance issued in accordance with and paid for at a rate which contemplates liability in accordance with state law.36 There is some
support for a change in the area of conflicts which would allow a
more equitable result in these cases.
In Bogen v. Bogen3t the North Carolina court allowed an Ohio
wife who was injured by the negligence of her husband on North
Carolina roads to sue although she probably could not have maintained her action in Ohio." The majority opinion did not depart
from lex loci since North Carolina was both the loci and fori, but in
applying its law the court used strong and poetic language to express
a prejudice for allowing a wife to sue her husband.39 They quoted
an earlier opinion where the idea that husband and wife are one is
ridiculed as "an inference drawn by courts in a barbarous age"4
and where the court in reaffirming a belief in tort relief for a wife
said: "Civilization and justice have progressed thus far with us, and
never again will 'the sun go back ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz.'
Isaiah, 38:8 " 41 It would seem that such strong belief in a wife's
rights would be present sixty-six years later, but in conflicts cases
we sometimes do indeed allow "the sun to go back."
" Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965); Petrea v. Ryder
Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); cf. Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware,

Inc., v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Bogen
v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).

" See, for discussion on insurance and suggestion that parties may purchase coverage with the liability imposed by the principal place of driving in
mind, Ehrenweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J.

595 (1960).

"219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
The court did not have to decide the correct Ohio Law. Id. at 54, 12

S.E.2d at 652.
'°Id. at 53, 12 S.E.2d at 651.
Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920).
Id. at 524, 105 S.E. at 210.
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Ironically, the three dissenting judges in Bogeit' would have
abandoned the strict le% loci doctrine and refused the wife her action on the basis that the right to compensation is a chose in action
which is personal property. Since the situs of personal property is
the residence of the owner, they would have applied the law of the
domicile. The dissent was somewhat ahead of its time, for the
reasoning is similar to the "center of gravity" theory used by some
43

courts today.

It is also significant that in 1963 a federal court sitting in North
Carolina, when faced with the problem of how the North Carolina
court would decide a conflicts question, anticipated a "more flexible
approach which would allow the court in each case to inquire which
state has the most significant relationships. . . -"" A subsequent

decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court makes it clear the
federal court incorrectly stated the North Carolina law.45 However, the implication is that a federal judge felt the court was on
the threshold of, or at least amiable to, change.
The recent passage of the Uniform Commercial Code46 and
other statutes permit the courts to deviate from strict lex loci. The
Code allows the parties to agree which state's law will apply in a
contract situation when two jurisdictions are involved ;47 the Workman's Compensation Act provides compensation provisions for employees incidentally injured outside the state;48 and the Insurance
Act deems insurance contracts to have been made in this state and
subject to its laws if property, lives or interests in the state are
49
covered or if applications were taken in the state.
The New Hampshire court states that North Carolina clings to
lex loci but speculates that its "failure to reject it has resulted from
an unwillingness to abandon established precedent before they were
sure that a better rule was available, not to any belief that the old
219 N.C. at 55, 12 S.E.2d at 211.
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240

N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
"'Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.

Co., 319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1963).
"'Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963); Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, N.C. Case Law, 43 N.C.L. Riv. 895, 896 (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965). The Code becomes
effective midnight, June 30, 1967.
'rN.C.

GEN. STAT.

•N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 25-1-105 (1965).
§ 97-36 (1965).

'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28 (1965).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

rule was a good one." 5 Whether or not this is the North Carolina
court's position, there is good argument for the court making express exceptions to protect legal rights now often nullified by crossing state boundaries. As suggested, the exception would be a very
narrow one and apply only to residents injured in automobiles
driven by a resident while in transit from and intended to return
to the state of residence. This approach would allow the court to
alleviate inequities and effect clear policies while awaiting a suitable
alternative, if the court desires an alternative, to lex loci delicti. Such
an approach would preserve predictability and consistency in North
Carolina conflicts law.
PHrILIP G. CARSON

Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-The "Mere Evidence"
Rule-Applicability to the States
The mere evidence rule of Gouled v. United States,1 that it is a
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure to take evidence from a defendant's premises
unless that evidence is contraband, stolen property, or an instrumentality of a crime, was declared by the United States Supreme
Court in 1921. Courts have found it difficult to apply the instrumentality exception, and the theory of the rule has been harshly
criticized.2 After the decision in Mapp v. Ohio,3 which requires
that evidence taken in violation of the fourth amendment be excluded
in state trials, the question was certain to arise whether Gouled
should be applied to the states.
"0
1255

N.H. at -

, 222 A.2d at 207.

U.S. 298 (1921).

'MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT §

5.04 (1957); 8

§§ 2184a, 2264 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

'Although the mere evidence rule rests primarily on the fourth amendment, the peculiar origin of the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), gave rise to a theory that the rule rests on a dual basis of the
fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd did not involve a search at all, but a
court order to produce incriminating documents. In invalidating the order
the United States Supreme Court first announced that a search for mere
evidence was prohibited by the fourth amendment. Next the order was declared invalid under the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination. Although a dissent insisted that the fifth amendment alone was the
correct basis for the decision, a third justification for the holding was added:
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5 the Fourth Circuit
In Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary
Court of Appeals became the first federal court to consider this question. In Hayden the police entered a house in hot pursuit of an
armed robber and found Hayden undressed in bed. During an otherwise lawful search of the house the police seized a cap found under
a mattress and a jacket and trousers found in a washing machine.
This clothing was admitted in evidence at the state trial as proof
that Hayden was the man seen running from the scene of the robbery. In federal habeas corpus proceedings Hayden objected to the
admission of the clothing in evidence on the grounds that it was
mere evidence. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and
holding that the Gouled rule applies to the states, ordered a new
trial.6
The United States Supreme Court has set no standard for determining how close the relationship between the evidence and the
crime must be before that evidence can fairly be termed an instrumentality.7 In Marron v. United States' the Court indicated that
the exception should be broadly construed in favor of the prosecution when it held that receipts and utility bills seized in a raid were
instrumentalities of a prohibition violation because they were part

the order was equated with a search and the opinion concluded that any
search for mere evidence was prohibited by the joint operation of the fifth
and fourth amendments. The theory that one of the functions of the fourth
amendment is to prevent self-incrimination fails to account for the fact that
once the safeguards of oath, specificity, and particularity are met, the fourth
amendment allows the use of force to exact evidence from a suspect's
premises. If followed to a logical conclusion, the fifth amendment would
allow no search whatsoever, or would at least protect the suspect from
seizure of the most damaging evidence. But the effect of the rule is just the
opposite. Because of the exceptions for contraband, stolen property, and
instrumentalities, only the least incriminating evidence is protected. See
State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); Comment, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 355, 360-64 (1966); Comment, A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U.
CHi. L. Rtv. 319, 324-27 (1953), Comment, 31 YALE. L.J. 518, 522 (1922).
For some time after the decision in Mapp it was thought that the states
would not be faced with the mere evidence rule because Mapp applies only
the fourth amendment to the states. The fifth amendment was applied to the
states as well in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See Shellow, The
Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Ride: The Search for and Seizure of
Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. Rtv. 172, 180, (1964).
363 F.2d 647 (1966).
'Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25.2 (Supp. 1965) a search warrant may
issue for anything "which may constitute evidence of a felony ...

"

The

holding in Hayden invalidates this portion of the statute.
'Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Ride and The Reason, 54 GEo. L.J.
593, 614 (1966).
275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
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of the outfit used by operators of a speakeasy. But five years later
the Court favored a narrow construction in United States v. Lefkowitze when similar items were held to be mere evidence. The
court attempted to distinguish the cases by saying that the search in
Lefkowitz was more extensive and exploratory,1" but as far as the
nature of the evidence is concerned, the cases cannot be reconciled. 1 '
Due to this lack of a standard the lower federal courts have found
it difficult to apply the rule evenly and many inconsistencies have
resulted. For example, in United States v. Lerner"2 an address book
was held to be mere evidence. But in Matthews v. Correa3 a similar
address book was held to be an instrumentality. 4
The property theory that is used to support the Gouled rule has
been harshly criticized. 5 The basic idea of the rule is that property
of the defendant may not be seized. Stolen property may be seized
because it does not belong to the defendant. Contraband may be
taken because the defendant's property rights in it have been voided
by statute.' To justify seizure of instrumentalities the courts resort
to the ancient deodand principle that things used in the commission
of a crime are forfeited to the state.' To justify this property
theory it is sometimes said that stolen property may be seized because the law wishes to return it to the owner and that contraband
°285 U.S. 452 (1932).
'ld. at 465.

" LASSoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

135-36 (1937).

"2100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
"S135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943).
" As to documentary items conzpare United States v. Loft on Sixth
Floor of Bldg., 182 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (letters offering obscene
materials for sale were mere evidence) and Takahashi v. United States, 143
F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944) (letter containing evidence of criminal fraud held
inadmissible) and Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933)
(documents ordered returned after search) with United States v. Klaw, 227
F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (advertising circular for obscene materials
held to be instrumentality) and Landon v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d
285 (2d Cir. 1936) (invoice used in smuggling operation was instrumentality) and Sayers v. United States, 2 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1924) (where business records were held to be instrumentalities). As to non-documentary
items compare Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(handkerchief with evidence of sex crime not instrumentality) with United
States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (1958) (shoes worn in bank robbery were
instrumentalities).
"'Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 474, 478 (1961).
1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
17 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
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is confiscated to prevent further use.'
The forfeiture of instrumentalities cannot be so easily explained. Some instrumentalities
such as weapons should be taken to prevent further use in crime or
to protect the searching officers from attack. 9 But other instrumentalities such as a cancelled check, that cannot be used in crime
again and are certainly not dangerous, may be seized as well." °
Critics consider this property theory archaic and arbitrary. They
argue that the primary purpose of search is to secure evidence 2 ' and
that the police should not be hindered by ancient notions of forfeiture. The protection given to mere evidence is arbitrary because it
defeats the policy of making evidence available to the police without
balancing any comparable interest of the defendant against that
22
policy.
In defense of the rule it is said that it protects privacy by preventing an exploratory search or fishing expedition among the papers
and effects of a suspect.23 Learned Hand provided the most famous
statement of this idea in United States v. Poller,2 4 "it is only fair
to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is
the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in
rummaging about his personal effects to secure evidence against
him... limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the
guest itself." Critics argue, however, that in practice the rule does
not protect privacy. During a search for contraband, stolen property
or instrumentalities the police must typically go through a suspects's
18
United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 98 (1962).
19
Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
0Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1940).
21 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960).
This is the
attitude of the North Carolina Supreme Court. See State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 601, 148 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1966) (dictum). But see Church v.
State, 151 Fla. 24, 31, 9 So. 2d 164, 167 (1942).
2 Comment, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 355, 360 (1966).
"Proponents of the rule also argue that it is required by the history of
the fourth amendment. Citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1785), the English landmark case prohibiting the
general warrant, they conclude that the first clause of the fourth amendment includes a prohibition against a search for mere evidence. Fraenkel,
Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. lRv. 361, 366 (1921);
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L. REv. 257-77 (1925). Later critics insist,
however, that the fourth amendment must be read as a whole as a safeguard
against general search and that no ban on seeking evidence per se is included
in the prohibition against unreasonable search. Kamisar, The WiretappingEavedropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 914
(1960). Comment, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 355, 363-67 (1966).
"United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (1930).
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papers and effects as thoroughly as they would if they were permitted to search for all relevant evidence.2" If the police are going to
find the evidence in any event, they should be allowed to use it."
Since Mapp, defendants have urged acceptance of the rule in the
state courts with increasing frequency, but the states have found the
rule undesirable 7 The California Supreme Court2 8 has challenged
the rule saying that although the United States Supreme Court has
paid lip service to it, it has in fact been abrogated and cannot be
considered a constitutional standard that should apply to the states
under Mapp.- It is suggested that the rule, if it is to be retained at
all, should be reduced to an expression of the Supreme Court's
power to supervise the federal courts.3 ° Other state courts have not
"Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 477 (1961). But see Ramsey, Acquisition of Evidence by Search and Seizure, 47 Mica. L. Rnv. 1137, 1155 (1930).
' The test of reasonableness under the circumstances offers protection
from excessively extensive searches. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S.
346 (1957); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Although the
test of reasonableness applies to persons, the mere evidence rule does not.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) where police were allowed
to take a blood test over the objection of a suspected drunk driver. In Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1913) (dictum) it was said that the
state has always had the right "to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime." If
the type of evidence is immaterial in the search of a person, it would seem
that any type of evidence should be available in the search of a dwelling.
', State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1966) ; Eisentrager v. State,
79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963); People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1963). Contra, Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127
S.E.2d 406 (1962).
People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1966).
.' The California Supreme Court in People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780,
782, 408 P.2d 108, 110 (1966) relies on Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34
(1963) where it was said, "The States are not ... precluded from demands
of effective law enforcement in the States, provided that those rules do not
violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. . .

."

Thus the United States Supreme Court has indicated willing-

ness to reinterpret older decisions which might be onerous to the states.
The holding of Ker, that state police do not have to give the traditional
knock and notice on the door of a dwelling place before beginning a search
if giving notice will result in immediate danger that persons inside will
destroy evidence, was not, however, a concession of the same magnitude
that a re-evaluation of the mere evidence rule would be. There is only one
United States Supreme Court case on the knock and notice requirement and
it is based on a statute rather than the Constitution. Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301 (1958). The mere evidence rule has been directly applied
three times by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd, Goided, and
Lefkowitz to suppress evidence and it is well represented in dicta. See e.g.,
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 (1950).
" The Gouled rule has been incorporated into FED. R. Climn. P. 41(e).
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been so direct but have attempted to avoid application of the rule
through broad construction of the instrumentality exception. For
example, in State v. Chinn3 ' the Oregon Supreme Court recently
held that bed linen, a camera, and film showing a photograph of the
prosecutrix in the defendant's bedroom were instrumentalities of
the crime of statutory rape.
In Hayden the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected
both these approaches. Although the court shows little enthusiasm
for the rule it concludes that the holdings and dicta of the United
2
States Supreme Court require application of the rule to the states."
The court also serves notice that it intends to enforce the rule
strictly in favor of the defendant and will resist "stretching to the
point of distortion the category of 'instrumentality of crime,' in
order to achieve the admission in evidence of articles manifestly of
evidential value only." 33
It would nevertheless seem that practical difficulties from application of the rule in the states will outweigh its benefits. Although
the rule does make a search somewhat less onerous for a suspect, 34
especially where papers are involved, 35 it has been suggested that
1231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). See also Elder v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304, 318 (Dist. Ct App. 1966), but see Cagle v.
State, 147 Tex. Crim. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928 (1944).
363 F.2d at 651.
" There is room for doubt that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals will
adhere to this narrow construction. A dissent in Hayden, 363 F.2d at 655,
that the clothing should be considered instrumentalities of the crime of
armed robbery because it was hidden in an attempt to perfect escape, is one
of the most extreme applications of the rule that has been suggested in the
federal reports. See United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1962),
where the court gave the instrumentality exception an extremely broad construction in holding that receipts on which a prostitute recorded the amounts
received from customers were instrumentalities of a Mann Act violation.
" Hand was apparently motivated by this consideration in Poller. See
note 24 supra and accompanying text. Kaplan, supra note 15, at 479 has
suggested that this "pro tanto" protection of a suspect would be "just as well
served by a restriction on search to the even-numbered days of the month."
" The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting that all United States Supreme
Court cases applying the mere evidence rule to suppress evidence involved
papers, has suggested that papers, and not effects, should be protected by
the rule. State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965). Under this
view papers deserve more protection than effects because of their thought
content and closer relationship to privacy. Searches of papers can also be
extensive. Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Wis. 1960)., At
times the mere evidence rule may be helpful in preventing excessive seizure
of papers on the grounds that they throw light on the suspect's operations,
but it would seem that this is a question of relevancy on which other and
more appropriate rules are available. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
82
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the state police are faced with a greater variety of situations than
federal officers were evidence such as that in Hayden is necessary
for a conviction."' It is further urged that if confessions are often
to be denied the state police and greater emphasis on scientific investigation is desirable, the police in the states should be allowed
maximum access to evidence in an otherwise lawful search."
HENRY C. McFADYEN, JR.

Constitutional Law-Illegal Search and Seizure-Injunction
Dissatisfied with the more common remedies for unlawful police
searches, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Lankford v. Gelston,1 has added significant dimensions to the use
of the federal injunction. The case arises from the efforts of Baltimore police to apprehend two Negroes suspected of killing a city
policeman. Possessing arrest warrants, but no search warrants, the
police entered more than three hundred homes within a period of
nineteen days. The searches, largely based on anonymous tips, were
conducted predominately in Negro neighborhoods. Plaintiffs, owners of the homes searched, sought a temporary restraining order in
the federal district court against further searches. Jurisdiction was
based on section 1983 of the Judicial Code.2 Since the searches had
ceased and the police commissioner had issued a general order 3 prohibiting further searches without probable cause, the court refused
4
relief.
The court of appeals, however, was unimpressed with the general order, primarily because it left determination of probable cause'
'8 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319, 327-32 (1962); Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of
Search and Seizure, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 150 (1962).
" Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647, 658 (1966).
'364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress."
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
' For a full text of the order see 240 F. Supp. at 555 n.2 (1965).
'Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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to the individual officer and because it was not issued until the suspects had apparently left town.' Noting the lack of other remedies
for the plaintiffs, the court reversed and ordered the district court
to enjoin the Baltimore police "from conducting a search of any
private house to effect the arrest of any person not known to reside
therein, whether with or without an arrest warrant, where the belief
that the person is on the premises is based only on an anonymous tip
and hence without probable cause." 7
The Lankford case, then, offers an interesting basis for an analysis of federal injunctions limiting state police activity. It should
be noted that when state remedies are sufficient to protect an individual's constitutional rights the federal courts are reluctant to interfere, primarily because of an interest in harmony between state and
federal judicial systems.' In the recent Negro civil rights cases,
however, the courts have ignored considerations of comity by either
enjoining enforcement of segregation statutes 9 or simply declaring
such statutes unconstitutional."0 And even in the face of the federal
anti-injunction statute,-" at least one court has allowed an injunction after the commencement of a state criminal prosecution."
In Lankford, no federal interference with a state judicial process
was involved, and in such a situation the considerations of comity
vanish. Moreover, if the conduct of the defendant is of a continuing
nature, the court will usually grant an injunction,' 3 and sometimes
'The suspects were later apprehended in New York.
364 F.2d at 206. The unanimous opinion was written by Judge Sobeloff.
' See Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ga. 1960)
where the court refused to grant an injunction against the enforcement of a
handbill distribution statute which plaintiffs claimed abridged their right of
freedom of speech. Relief was likewise denied in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) where the plaintiffs contended that a similar
ordinance restricted their freedom of religion.
'Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963).
" Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); Browder v. Gayle,
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), zff'd 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1965) provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
" United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 850 (1963).
13 See, e.g., Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp.
620 (N.D. Ind. 1948), where police were enjoined from attendance at union
meetings, which conduct was held to violate the union's rights of free speech
and freedom of assembly, and Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga.
1947) where the court enjoined police from further violations of plaintiff's
right of due process after noting statements of the police that they intended
to do so.
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may even be held in error for abuse of discretion if it fails to do
so.1 4 But if the defendant's misconduct has ceased, as in Lankford,
the court must rely on more subtle considerations before granting
an injunction.
One of the most important of these considerations is the likelihood of resumption of the conduct of the defendant. If events beyond his control have caused the cessation, the question will be moot
and an injunction unnecessary.' 5 If the cessation is voluntary on
the part of the defendant, the question still may be moot, 6 but
17
voluntary cessation is not alone enough to prevent an injunction.
The power of the court to grant injunctive relief "survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct,"' and the defendant must show
that "there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated."" Moreover, courts have had to recognize that certain extraneous factors may influence a defendant's choice of future conduct. For example, a firmly intrenched state policy of segregation
may make resumption of discrimination more likely and the need
for an injunction more acute." Related also to the defendant's con"'In Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960)
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since the plaintiff had proved
by undisputed evidence that he was being denied constitutional rights by
not being permitted to use airport waiting room facilities reserved for white
passengers, the district court had no discretion to deny a preliminary injunction. See also Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956). In that case the district court was held
to have abused its discretion by refusing to enjoin members of the board of
education from enforcing a policy of racial segregation. See note 20 infra
and accompanying text.
1United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U.S. 466, 475-77 (1916).
See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 182 (1931).

"The slightest likelihood of resumption of notorious conduct will keep

the question from being moot. Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649,
657 (5th Cir. 1963). And the burden of the defendant to show mootness is
one. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
a heavy
1
2 Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1944);
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 327 (1944); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950).
"United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). See also
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Myers Mfg.
Co., 242 U.S. 202 (1916).
" 1945).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d
Cir.C
Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1963). In other cases
involving the civil rights of Negroes, dictum has indicated that plaintiffs are
entitled to an injunction as a matter of right. In Clemons v. Board of Educ.,
228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), the court stated:
The single question which appears to divide us is what guidance, if
any, we should now give the district court as to the future exercise of
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duct is the nature and degree of harm that the conduct, if resumed,
could inflict upon the plaintiff. If the harm seems irreparable, as in
Lankford, an injunction will naturally be more likely to follow.
Thus, courts view a defendant's conduct with considerable suspicion
and require much more than mere voluntary cessation before refusing an injunction: "Police protestations of repentance and reform
timed to anticipate or to blunt the force of a lawsuit offer insufficient
assurance that similar raids will not ensue when another aggravated
crime occurs."'"
Another important consideration concerning the advisability of
an injunction is the availability to the plaintiff of other remedies.
Other than the possibility of injunctive relief, a person is protected
from violation of his constitutional rights by two devices-the exclusionary rule, whereby illegally obtained evidence is barred in a
criminal proceeding, and the civil suit for damages. Neither of
these remedies would have been useful in Lankford, as the court
there pointed out. 2 Many excellent arguments have been made that
23
the exclusionary rule is of little deterrent value in any situation,
and in Lankford the complete impotency of this remedy is even more
obvious. The exclusionary rule applies only at trial, the illegal
search having already occurred. Clearly if officers search a home
without a warrant and find nothing incriminating, the rule is of no
use at all to the victim of such a search.24
If the exclusionary rule has failed as a deterrent to unlawful
invasions of privacy, civil remedies have fared little better. The
right to sue a state official in federal court was clearly established
its jurisdiction. That question, I think unfortunately, must apparently

be cast in terms of whether or not there has been an 'abuse of discretion.' Certainly there has been none in the popular concept of that
phrase.... But the law of Ohio and the Constitution of the United
States simply left no room for the [school] Board's action, whatever
motives the Board may have had. I think the appellants were clearly
entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of right in this case.
228 F.2d at 859.
21 364 F.2d at 203. See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
22 364 F.2d at 202.
23The exclusionary rule places no personal sanction upon the policeman.
Even if the average policeman understood the rule, seldom will he notice
the final result of a violation. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchnnant?, 14
Am. U.L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1964).
Irvine v. California, 237 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1954); Brinegar v. United
I,
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952).
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by Monroe v. Pape. 5 The Supreme Court there held that section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act26 provides such a civil remedy regardless of whether the plaintiff has exhausted other available remedies.
The case, involving unlawful search and seizure, construed such
police activity as under color of law for the purposes of section
1983.27 Though the reasoning in Monroe has been criticized,2 it is
clear that section 1983 presently provides for both injunctive relief
and money damages in a civil rights violation.' Nevertheless, the
utility of a private suit against a policeman remains extremely
doubtful. Even if a plaintiff should win a judgment, the personal
assets of most policemen will be insufficient for compensation, and,
in any event, the deterrent value of the suit for damages seems
slight at best.3 0
Viewing the Lankford situation in light of the foregoing discussion, the decision appears sound. Conspicuously, however, the
court ignored an important problem peculiar to the injunction, that
is, the severe penalty for its violation. A non-complying policeman
may face a heavy, arbitrary fine or even imprisonment. The deterrent effect is plain, but one must ask whether this remedy goes too
far by compromising effective law enforcement. If the Lankford
decision represents a trend toward wholesale injunctive relief in civil
rights violations, it is possible to foresee situations in which policemen, for fear of a fine or imprisonment, will neglect conscientious
law enforcement. Unfortunately, the court in Lankford was faced
with only two choices. It could have either affirmed the lower court's
*"365 U.S. 167 (1961).
'o
2

See note 2 supra.

Monroe decision was based on the reasoning in Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
TThe

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The court further held that a

municipal corporation was not liable to a civil suit under § 1983.
"8Justice Frankfurter's lengthy dissent in the Monroe case is consistent
with his concurring opinion in Snowden v, Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 16 (1944):
"It [the jurisdictional problem] is not to be resolved by abstract considerations such as the fact that every officer who proports to wield power conferred by a state is pro tanto the state. Otherwise every illegal discrimination by a policeman on the beat would be state action for purpose of suit
in a federal court."
' Both of these remedies never appear to have been simultaneously
awarded; however, there seems to be no good reason why this could not
be done. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 839, 846-49 (1964).
'0 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 (1961); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41, 42-44 (1949)
(Murphy, J. dissenting); Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 182 (W.D.
Pa. 1965). See generally Editorial Note, 12 How. L.J. 285 (1966).
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decision, thereby denying any relief, or it could have granted an
injunction, a regrettably negative sanction. Considering the seriousness of the police conduct, the choice of the latter seems justified.
The point to be noted, however, is not whether the decision is
right or wrong. The real importance of this case is the fact that it
illustrates the disturbing lack of an adequate solution to the problem
of police-community relations. The recent riots in several large
American cities underscore the need for such a solution.31 The court
in Lankford felt that an injunction restricting police behavior would
solve the problem. 2 Perhaps the court was right in this particular
case, but it must be remembered that the wisdom of judicial control
of the police function has already been questioned; furthermore, an
injunction is only granted after an individual's rights have been
violated, and even then it is very limited in scope.
What is lacking is a positive, constructive answer to the problem.
Rather than subsequent censorship by the courts of police decisions,
perhaps the answer lies in increasing judicial responsibility in the
law enforcement process itself.3" Others have suggested legislative
action in this area, 4 while some feel that civilian participation in
the police function may be the answer. 5 Whatever action is ultiOne writer attributes the present difficulties with the police function
to four major modern developments: (1) urbanization, (2) recent Supreme
Court civil rights decisions, (3) mass migration of Negroes to Northern
cities, and (4) the civil rights movement. Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 Mica. L. REv. 47 (1965).
2 "The sense of impending crisis in police-community relations persists,
and nothing would so directly ameliorate it as a judicial decree forbidding
the practices complained of." 364 F.2d at 204.
"' Greater fairness in law enforcement practices may result by requiring
that a judge, rather than an ordinary magistrate, should determine whether
arrest or search warrants should issue. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcetment Decisions, 63 MicH. L. REv. 987 (1965).
31

", "If legislatures should enact their own ideas of what is reasonable in

the way of search and seizure, would the Supreme Court insist that it has
the exclusive right of definition, and declare the statutes invalid? . . . I can
only venture a guess that the Court would not invalidate such legislation.
• . ." Waite, Whose Rulesf The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48
A.B.A.J. 1057, 1058 (1962). The writer is a former Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan and was a member of the Supreme Court's advisory committee on the rules of criminal procedure.

" The Civilian Review Board, a controversial method of regulating police

conduct, has been adopted in a few American cities. It is interesting to note
that in the November 8, 1966 General Election, the residents of New York

City overwhelmingly voted against that city's existing Civilian Review

Board. For a further discussion of such independent review bodies see
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 1 (1964).
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mately taken to eliminate police-community hostility, it is important
that it be taken now. Otherwise, the future may offer an increasing
number of cases like Lankford v. Gelston.
D. J. JONES, JR.

Constitutional Law-Power of Legislature to Disqualify
Members-Elect
Julian Bond, representative-elect to the Georgia General Assembly, was not allowed to take the oath of office on the first day of the
session. Challenges to his qualifications were referred to a special
committee, that held hearings and recommended that he not be
seated. The House approved the recommendation and denied Bond
his seat. In Bond v.Floyd,1 Bond and two members of his constituency sought to enjoin the exclusion. The three-judge District
Court, one judge dissenting, upheld the House action as a reasonable
exercise of its power to judge the qualifications of its members.
It found the House justified in declaring the strong anti-war statement of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which
Bond supported and expanded on,' repugnant to the oath required
of House members to support the federal constitution. Thus, there
was no denial of due process.
The dissent did not reach the federal constitutional issues. Construing the power of the House to judge the qualifications of its
members as limited to the qualifications specifically mentioned in
the state constitution,3 it would hold the House action void as in
violation of that constitution. The majority thought this a "restrictive view, unfounded in recognized authority."4 Both opinions
turned to the federal Congress for legislative precedents.
'251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga. 1966) reversed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4038
(U.S. Dec. 5, 1966). See note 75 infra.
2Id. at 336, 337. The SNCC statement opposed the war aid declared
support for men who would not respond to the draft, calling for a "freedom
fight" at home as an alternative. Bond asserted that he fully supported the
statement, and added that he was a pacifist who admired the courage of
draft-card burners.
8 GA. CONsT. art. III, § VII, para. 1. This provision is substantially the
same as U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The qualifications mentioned in the Georgia
Constitution are citizenship, residency, age, no former conviction of a crime
of moral turpitude, and no holding of a civil or military office at the time
of election.
'251 F. Supp. at 340.
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In the most recent debate on congressional power to disqualify
members-elect, "the intent of the founding fathers" was seen by one
senator as "convincing" support for a finding that the power is unlimited.5 The history of the relevant constitutional provisions has
been put to such use before, but that has been by no means its only
service. 6 Another reading of the remarks invoked in both causes,
set in the context of 1787, may yield a better appreciation of "the
intent of the founding fathers."
The Pinckney draft of a federal constitution, presented on May
29, 1787, contained age, citizenship and residenc6 requirements for
members of the national legislature. It also provided that the House
should be the judge of the "elections, returns and qualifications" of
members, a provision which passed untouched to the final Constitution.7 This draft constitution was seldom referred to in the convention, but provided a convenient skeleton for debate-and, more
important, was submitted on July 26, along with the resolutibns of
the entire body, to the committee of detail.8 In debate on qualifications, the delegates agreed on a minimum age of twenty-five for
Representatives, though Mr. Wilson objectedY Delegate Mason later
moved that the committee of detail include a clause setting minimum
requirements of property and citizenship.'
Mr. Dickinson "was
against any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It was
impossible to make a complete one; and a partial one would, by
implication, tie up the hands of the legislature from supplying the
omissions."" Consistent with his earlier position, Wilson agreed,
on the grounds that "odious and dangerous characters" might then
be immune from disqualification. 12 Despite the Dickinson and Wilson views, occasionally quoted to show that Congress was not expected to be limited in disqualifying, the convention sent the Mason
resolution to the committee.' 3
'93 CONG. REc. 12 (1947). See also Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333,
341 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
'See, e.g., 1 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 477 (1907) [hereinafter cited as HINDS].
7

MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

129 (Elliot. ed. 1845).
Ild.
at 375.
0
Id. at 228.

'Id. at
'lId. at
1Id. at
1"Id. at

370.
371.
373.
375
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The proposed constitution, reported on August 6, contained age,
citizenship and residence requirements as suggested by Pinckney. 4
Delegates were disappointed, however, by the treatment of the property qualification, embodied in proposed art. VI, § 2: "The legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to
property, as to the said legislature shall seem expedient."' 5 James
Madison voiced strong opposition to this grant of authority where no
authority had been proposed: "The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a republican government, and
ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the legislature could regulate either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution.""
When Gouverneur Morris moved to go further, and allow the
legislature complete freedom to set qualifications by striking "with
regard to property" from the section, Mr. Williamson thought, "This
would surely never be admitted.' 7 Reasserting the dangers of such
power, Madison pointed to parliamentary abuses as "a lesson worthy
of our attention." British legislators had regulated qualifications for
selfish, political or religious ends, he said. These objections were
evidently persuasive, for the Morris motion was defeated." Then,
before the final vote on art. VI, § 2, as reported, Mr. Wilson rose
to plead again for a wider concession of power to Congress. He
argued that the section be dropped because it "would constructively
exclude every other power of regulating qualifications." This time
Wilson was on the winning side, as the section was defeated.' 9
But whether that action meant what he said it should is another
matter. His position seems feeble, in that the convention had already set, over his objections, citizenship and age qualifications, and
a residence requirement that he could be expected to dislike for the
same reasons. That art. VI, § 2, should have been proposed at all
bears out Wilson's and Dickinson's claims that a list of qualifications
would constructively exclude all others, leaving the legislature without authority in this area unless granted elsewhere in the instrument.
The Morris amendment of the section would have come closest to
"IId.at 377.
' Id. at 377.
'AId. at 404.
2" Id. at 404.
"IId.at 404.
10 Id. at 404.
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Wilson's wishes, but it was soundly defeated. Interpreters of this
debate should find it as hard to deny Mr. Wilson's "inclusion of one
is exclusion of all others" argument, as to agree that because the
convention excluded one qualification, it meant to grant Congress
power to include all others.
Madison's strict view of congressional power in this area, as
may be expected, was promulgated in The Federalist. In discussing
the qualifications specified, Madison suggests that they are exclusive:
"Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
federal government is open to men of every description, whether
native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth or to any particular profession of religious faith."2
More persuasive, perhaps, is Hamilton's full agreement with this
construction, in a more definite statement: "The qualifications of
the persons who may choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked
upon on another occasion, are defined and fixed in the constitution,
and are unalterable by the legislature."21 Therefore, Hamilton concluded, there need be no fear that Congress might succeed in barring
access to all but the rich; it has not the power.
Adherence to this theory has been somewhat erratic in Congress.
In times of unusual stress-post-Civil War, World War I, and a
period of national indignation at the marital habits of Mormonslegislators have seen other values as superior. But it is insufficient
to discuss deviations as solely due to the pressure of events, for
each generation sees its own times as turbulent, and finds new requirements for arbitrary action: the Vietnam dissenter today poses
the same threat as did the unreconstructed rebel a century ago.
A brief survey may reveal whether congressional practice in this
area has established a different rule, based on policies unrecognized
in 1787. If it has not, and if the policies then relied on remain
predominant, perhaps it is time to reiterate the limits on legislative
authority over qualifications.
It was early settled that the states could not add qualifications
for members of Congress to those prescribed in the Constitution.
In the contested election cases of Barney v. McCreery22 in the
"
21 TnE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 249 (Hallowell ed. 1837).
Id. No. 60, at 286.
2 Clarke & H. Elec. Cas. 167 (1807).
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House, and Lyman Trumbull 23 in the Senate, candidates were seated
though they had not met state requirements. The Committee on

Elections' report in the McCreery case emphasized that Congress is
."sole judge" of qualifications.2 4 State courts have since uniformly
conceded Congress exclusive jurisdiction in this area.25 Indeed, they
have customarily adopted the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, suggested by the committee in McCreery as the broader
basis of its holding,28 in construing their own constitutional provisions concerning qualifications.
The Senate, though it had apparently once deviated from strict
adherence to that hoary rule, 28 did not squarely face the question
until 1862. Its answer then was in harmony with the Madisonian
view and the McCreery understanding. When Senator Fessenden
moved that Benjamin Stark's credentials be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for an investigation of alleged disloyalty,
he considered his action unprecedented. 29 The committee agreed, refusing to go beyond an examination of the credentials, and recommending that Stark be seated. 0 Senator Sumner argued that the
Constitution, by requiring an oath of office, had made loyalty a
necessary requirement."' This suggestion was sharply debated, and
"8Hupman, Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, S. Doc. No.
71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962). [hereinafter cited as Hupman Elec. Cas.]
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807) [1789-1824].
See, e.g., Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, appeal dismissed,
340 U.S. 881 (1950); Odegard v. Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717
1963); State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d
04 (1946). Compare State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Swanson, 127 Neb. 806,
257 N.W. 255 (1934), with State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246,
6 N.W.2d 89 (1942). Contra,24 TEMP. L.Q. 484 (1951).
2" 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877 (1807) [1789-1824]; accord, Wood v. Peters,
Mob. 79 (1889).
"*Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 (1853); Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578,
71 A.2d 352 (1950); Black v. Trower, 79 Va. 123 (1884). In Shub v.
Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950), an additional oath was upheld as
an effectuation of a loyalty requirement in the state constitution. As thus
interpreted, the oath was found constitutional in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). The court in Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686
(N.Y. 1824), distinguished between an unconstitutional addition of qualifications and a constitutional disqualification as part of the punishment for
certain crimes.
" John M. Niles, 1 HINDs § 441. Niles' sanity was investigated before
he was seated. The dissent in the principal case notes that sanity is a
qualification mentioned in the Georgia Constitution. 251 F. Supp. at 356.
"9 CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1862)
[covering 1833-1873].
" S. REP. No. 11, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. (1862).
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 994 (1862)

21

The oath is required by U.S.

CONST.

art. VI.

[covering 1833-1873].
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the Senate defeated Sumner's resolution that Stark not be seated
without prior investigation. The Senate then adopted the committee
report and admitted Stark."2
The Act of July 2, 1862, 8s prescribing an oath of past loyalty,
brought a change in congressional practice. As first passed by the
Senate, the "iron-clad oath" would not have been required of Representatives, Senators, the Vice-President or the President, 4 and so
would have avoided conflict with art. 1. But all exceptions save the
President were eliminated in conference compromises with the
House. " Its constitutionality was often attacked, 8 but never judicially determined. The Supreme Court, however, did strike down
an act which extended the test oath requirement to lawyers in federal
courts,"7 finding it an ex post. facto law and bill of attainder."8 The
oath was repealed in 1884.39
While it was in effect, both houses excluded elected candidates
for disloyalty, determining that the candidate could not swear truthfully.4" It is unclear from the debates whether this procedure was
considered warranted by the act; contradictory support was offered. 41 In one case, the House Committee on Elections paid lip
service to the theory that enumerated qualifications are exclusive
while disqualifying a candidate. 2 In the two cases in the House,
[covering 1833-1875].
"2 CONG. GLOnE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 994 (1862)
This action was, however, taken "without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding in the case." The Senate thus agreed with its committee's position
that though a member-elect could not be disqualified for prior disloyalty, he
might be expelled. In 1796, The Senate had decided it had no jurisdiction
to consider crimes alleged to have been committed by a member before election, 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 59, 60 (1796) [1789-1824]. It has never explicitly
asserted such jurisdiction, though it did conduct hearings on such a matter
in the case of Senator Gould, 68 CONG. REc. 43, 5914 (1926).
Ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1862), required the candidate to swear that he
had never borne arms against, or voluntarily supported the enemies of, the
United States.
8, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2861, 2872 (1862) [covering 18331873].
"Id. at 3012.
"See, e.g., McKee v. Young, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 422, 434 (1868) (minority
report).
reAct of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424 (1865).

" Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
" Act of May 13, 1884, 23 Stat. 21, 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1965).
"'Phillip F. Thomas, Hupman Elec. Cas. 40 (1868); Smith v. Brown, 2
Bart. El. Cas. 395 (1868); McKee v. Young, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 422 (1868).
"' CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 320-30, 632-35, 653-62, 678-86, 114456, 1169-75, 1205-10, 1232-43, 1260-71 (1868) [covering 1833-1873]; 1
HINDS

2 In

§§ 449, 451.

refusing to seat the candidate who received the second highest num-
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strong minority reports were filed, attacking the procedure.3 Three
other House candidates during Reconstruction were investigated before being sworn; all were seated." That the House felt constrained
to relieve R. R. Butler of his "disability" under the oath before
even administering it to him45 indicates that the act, rather than a
concept of inherent congressional power, was the basis for the Reconstruction disqualifications.
With the extraordinary exception of the Whittemore case,4" the
House, in 1870, returned to the practice of seating a member on a
mere showing of prima facie right. 7 When a candidate was first
challenged because of his polygamous marriages, this procedure was
regarded as well established. Subsequent to George Cannon's being seated, the Committee on Elections reported that it had no power
to question his qualifications beyond these expressly stated in the
Constitution, thus following (though not citing) the Stark case. 9
Reconstruction departures from these limits were distinguished as
special inquiries which "did not relate in the remotest manner to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the claimant under the Constitution.""0 The committee did not explain what power Congress
had relied on in those cases, and the question was again avoided
when, nine years later, Congress decided to exclude the same person
for the same offense. It was emphasized that Cannon was a delegate
from a territory, which Congress had power to regulate; no power
ber of votes, the Committee said: "This house can only be 'the judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of its members,' that is, can judge whether
each member has been elected according to the laws of his State and possesses the qualifications fixed by the Constitution. Here its power begins and
ends." Smith v. Brown, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 395, 404 (1868) (Emphasis added).
" Id. at 412, 434.
"Zeigler v. Rice, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 871 (1870) ; R. R. Butler, 2 Bart. El.
Cas. 461 (1868); Symes v. Trimble, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 370 (1868).

40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3183 (1868) [covering 1833-1873].
" B. F. Whittemore resigned from the House when expulsion proceed-

'" CoNG. GLOBE,

ings were begun against him; when he was re-elected to fill the vacancy thus
created, the House refused to seat him. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
4669-74 [covering 1833-1873]. Because of the unusual circumstances and
the fact that debate was not permitted on the question, the Whittemore case
has been found of no precedential value. 1 HINDS § 477; S. REP. No. 1010,
pt. 2, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1942) (minority report).
' Tucker v. Booker, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 772 (1870) ; Whittlesey v. McKenzie, 2 Bart. El. Cas. 746 (1870); 1 HINDS §§ 461, 465.
'82 CONG. REc. 7, 8 (1873).
'1 HINDS § 468.
°1 HINDS § 495.
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was claimed to exclude a Representative on such extra-constitutional
grounds.51
However, the House ignored the limitations in these cases in
1899, when Utah, since admitted to statehood, elected another polygamist. It referred Brigham Robert's credentials to a special committee before seating him.52 The committee's majority based its
recommendation of exclusion on three propositions :3 that the House
had an "inherent" right existing "of necessity" to exclude lawbreakers; that there was precedent for the exercise of that right;4
and that such action was authorized by a special statute dealing with
polygamy.5 5 The minority disagreed on every point, and recommended expulsion rather than exclusion.56 But the majority pointed
to the first Cannon case as evidence that a member once admitted
under similar circumstances had not been expelled. It doubted
whether Congress had the power to expel for conduct not connected
with the office.5 7 Despite the strong arguments of the minority,
58
Roberts was excluded.
Victor Berger, a former Representative, was challenged in 1919
under section three of the fourteenth amendment,5 9 for his anti-war
13 CONG.
Rzc. 3045-75 (1882).
33
CONG. REc. 53 (1899). The House thus bypassed its Committee on
Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress,
which reported, on a different matter, that the House could not demand
qualifications other than those specified. H.R. REP. No. 2307, 55th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1899).
2 33 CoNG. Rzc. 1073-84 (1900).
" The majority relied on the Act of July 2, 1862, and the Niles, Thomas,
Stark, Whittemore and Cannon Cases. It ignored the constitutional challenges to the Act, and the first Cannon case, denying its precedential value.
In addition, reference was made to several state cases, but these dealt with
either qualifications fixed in the constitutions, or administrative, rather than
legislative, offices. 1 HI NDS § 477.
"The Edmunds Act, 22 Stat. 30 (1882), 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1965), provides:
"

52

That no polygamist . .. in any Territory, or other place over which

the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction... shall be eligible
for election ... to or be entitled to hold any office ... in, under, or
for any such Territory or place, or under the United States.
The Act was held constitutional under Congress' power to regulate the
territories in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). But its applicability
to a State seems questionable.
" 33 CONG. Rzc. 1085-1100 (1900). They found the concept of "inherent" legislative right negatived by the intent of the constitution's draftsmen, and distinguished cases cited by the majority.
" 33 CONG. REc. 1072-1084 (1900). See note 32 supra.
5533 CONG. REC.

1217 (1900).

"t No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
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editorials in a socialist newspaper. He was excluded, the committee
finding that the amendment added a new qualification to the Constitution."0 This case was distinguished in the principal case as one
61
involving treason, one punishment for which is disqualification.
2
Berger, when re-elected, was excluded twice more.6
The House has not since disqualified a claimant on extra-constitutional grounds. The Senate has not done so since the Thomas
case. Reed Smoot, another polygamist, was challenged in 1904, but
he was allowed, and kept, his seat. The Senate overruled its committee by finding expulsion, not exclusion, the proper course of action in
such a case. 63 Again in 1942, the Senate rejected a majority report
and seated William Langer, accused of moral turpitude prior to his
election. 4
Theodore Bilbo was challenged on several grounds in 1947.
Senator Taft thought the issue was whether Bilbo's actions "void
the election,"0 5 which would place the case among those involving
Congress' express constitutional authority to judge elections. At any
rate, though the majority in Bond v. Floyd rely on Bilbo's case as
precedent, 0 no conclusive action was taken. The credentials were
tabled when Bilbo's ill health rendered him unable to defend himself,' and his death mooted the question.
This review of contested-election cases involving unpopular or
criminal acts committed prior to election reveals no development of
congressional power to disqualify on these grounds. Rather, it seems
to indicate that, in the few instances either house took such action,
it did not rely primarily on its judicial function. And, after each
such exercise, it ignored or distinguished the case and reaffirmed its
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 3.
6058 CoNG. Ric. 8223 (1919).
61251 F. Supp. at 355 (dissenting opinion). This conclusion seems justified by the debate, e.g., 58 CONG. REc. 8237 (1919).
"6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 56

(1935).

"41 CONG. REc. 3429 (1907).
"William Langer, Hupman Elec. Cas. 140 (1942).
CoNG. REc. 17 (1947).
"93
60251 F. Supp. at 341.
6793 CONG. REc. 109 (1947).
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constitutional limitations. The most recent statement by a congressional committee on the question will illustrate its present status:
The only rule presently in effect in the United States Senate
which defines standards relating to the right of a member elected
on the face of the returns whose right to a seat is challenged is
derived from the Constitution of the United States and is as
follows: [quoting art. I, § 5] .... There are no other statutory
enactments, rules, standards of ethics, or laws undertaking to define the right of the Senate to deny a seat to any duly elected
candidate....
* * , Since no standards exist, it would be grossly unfair now
to formulate those standards "after the fact" for retroactive ap68
plication ....
The principal casq, in upholding a broader exercise of power,
quoted the Supreme Court in Re Chapman to the effect that a legis'6
lature "necessarily possesses the inherent power of self-protection."
But in that case, the Court construed a contempt statute as applicable
only to those who refuse to cooperate in "matters within the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Congress,170 and cited an example
where Congress had overstepped its limits. 1' Since then, the Court
has plainly asserted that there are constitutional bounds beyond
which the legislature may not venture in its exercise of the power
of investigation."2 In oral argument on appeal of the instant case,
the Attorney-General of Georgia noted that Bond v. Floyd is a case
of first impression before the Supreme Court. But as in the investigation cases, "the controversy ... rests upon fundamental principles
'78
of the power of Congress and the limitations upon that power.
The Court has developed a practice in cases questioning the constitutionality of legislative investigations which is relevant here. Where
the exercise of that power runs the risk of infringing protected
rights, Congress and its committees will be held to a strict observance
,' S. REP. No. 647, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
166 U.S. 661, 668 (1897).
at 667.
"Old.
"1Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the first case to challenge
Congress' power of compulsory process, found the subject matter of the inquiry involved beyond the reach of a legislative investigation.
72 DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) ; United States
v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 117 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gibson v.

Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
"'Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 182 (1957).
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Such procedure would seem peculiarly approof their own rules.
priate where the rule is imbedded in the Constitution itself. The
Georgia Supreme Court has not interpreted this section of the state
constitution, but the section is a copy of the federal constitutional
provision. By adopting the interpretation of the Georgia Constitution urged by the dissent in the principal case, and supported by thehistory delineated above, the Supreme Court could follow its policy
of avoiding, where possible, the federal issues involved. 75
HUGHa B. ROGERS, JR.
7, Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Yellin v. United States,
374 U.S. 109 (1963); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
"' Immediately prior to printing of this note, the Supreme Court reversed
on first amendment grounds. Bond v. Floyd, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4038 (Dec.
5, 1966). Agreeing with the majority below on jurisdiction, a unanimous
Court, per Chief Justice Warren, held that disqualification of Bond because
of his statements violated his right of free expression. Bond could not have
been convicted of inciting violation of the draft law, and he was willing to
take the required oath to support the Constitution. The state may not demand from its legislators a higher standard of loyalty than it may constitutionally require of its citizens. Allowing a majority of his fellow-representatives to pass judgment on Bond's sincerity in swearing allegiance would
have a chilling effect on dissent. The "manifest function" of the first amendment is to fan, not quench, the fires of debate. The Court concluded by
stressing the benefits afforded by directing this encouragement to legislators
as well as to citizens: the constituency is better informed, better able to
judge its spokesmen, and better represented in government. Since it found
the Georgia Legislature's action in conflict with the first amendment, the
Court did not decide the other issues raised.
It seems clear that the Justices regarded this as an "easy" case when
brought within the focus of the first amendment. To support its assertion
that Bond's statements could not have been the basis for criminal conviction, the Court simply referred to three cases, declaring "no useful purpose
would be served by discussing" them. 35 U.S.L. WEEK at 4043. The cases
selected from out of the welter of free speech decisions of recent years were,
as may be expected, chosen for their aptness and emphasis. Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversed a Smith Act conviction obtained under
instructions which did not distinguish advocacy of an abstract principle
from incitement to action. So, in the principal case, the Court pointed out
that Bond's attack on the Selective Service System fell short of encouragement to violate the law. Yates was one of the cases "explaining" the requirements for prosecution under the Smith Act, following Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), a case which had modified the "clear and
present danger" test. Most observers thought that test had been removed
from the judicial toolbox, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment. 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 191, 213. But in Bond, two apparently orthodox "clear and
present danger" cases were cited: Terminiello v. Chicago, 337, U.S. 1 (1949)
(reversing a breach of peace conviction), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962) (reversing a contempt conviction). Where the problem is determining the point at which speech can become criminal, the Court seems
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Constitutional Law-Prisons-Confinement to Maximum Security
as an Abridgment of First Amendment Rights
Throughout history courts have viewed the prisoner as one who
by his crime forfeits all his individual rights.' This attitude, coupled
with public and judicial endorsement of strict prison discipline, has
led the judiciary to decline numerous invitations to pass upon the
to find utility remaining in the old test. Terminiello's aptness here lies in
its assertion of the first amendment's design to invite, rather than squelch,
dispute; Wood contained this statement: "The role that elected officials play
in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely
to express themselves on matters of current public importance." 370 U.S.
at 395.
In rejecting Georgia's contention that it could apply stricter standards
to legislators than to other citizens, the Court used a test more familiar to
recent free speech litigants, the balancing of interests. While the state has
a recognized interest in the legislators' sworn allegiance to the Constitution, "surely the oath gives it no interest in limiting its legislators' capacity
to discuss their views of local or national policy." 35 U.S.L. WEEK at 4043.
The countervailing interest of the public in having its representatives take
positions on controversial issues is high. Therefore, reasoned the Court, the
case may be decided by the "rationale" of New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). That case had decided that a critic of official conduct
should be protected by the first amendment from the imposition of an effectively punitive, though technically "civil," libel suit. Its statement of the
"central meaning" of the first amendment has made it a touchstone for
subsequent delineation of protected speech, e.g., United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966), Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965). New York Times had found the "lesson" of the first amendment in
the attack on the Sedition Act of 1798, which had "carried the day in the
court of history." 376 U.S. at 273, 276. Clearly, the Court in Bond v.
Floyd found the action of the Georgia legislature a condemnable reminder of
that infamous act.
Whether qualifications enumerated in a state or federal constitution should
be regarded as exclusive, to prevent disqualifications on other grounds than
speech, was not decided. The Court observed in a footnote that "Madison
and Hamilton anticipated the oppressive effect on freedom of expression
which would result if the legislature could utilize its power of judging
qualifications to pass judgment on a legislator's political views." 35 U.S.L.
WEEK at 4043. But the Court did not draw, from the quotes selected,
the conclusion urged above. Whether a legislator disqualified on grounds
other than speech would have constitutional standing to challenge his exclusion in the federal courts, and whether, if presented with such a claim,
the Court would follow the "rule" urged above, are questions which must
await answer another day. That day could conceivably come early in 1967,
if Representative Lionel Van Deerlin is successful in his attempt to deny
Representative Adam Clayton Powell a seat in the Ninetieth Congress. See
N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
1 "He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which
the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the
slave of the State."
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
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constitutional propriety of internal regulations imposed by prison
administrators.2 This reluctance has been especially prominent in the
case of federal courts and state prisons.' Further, the courts have
often expressed their conviction that the management and control of
prisons is properly vested in executive agencies, and that they have no
power to intervene in administrative matters.' However, a growing
conviction on the part of the federal judiciary that a prisoner retains
certain individual rights has led some courts to abandon this "hands
off" doctrine.5 Recent decisions have granted prisoners privileges
to exercise such rights as prompt and timely access by mail to the
courts," communication with the outside world unimpaired by arbitrary prohibitions, 7 and subscription to a non-subversive Negro
newspaper by a Negro inmate.'
The single individual right to freedom of religion has been the
foundation for the overwhelming majority of inmate petitions, however, and the fight for protection of that freedom has been carried
on almost exclusively by Black Muslim prisoners.9 The Muslim
' For general discussion of judicial involvement in internal prison affairs
and the rights of prisoners, see Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:
The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
'E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 892 (1964); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240
F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen,
213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.

1950).
'E.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 817 (1965); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1963); Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 930 (1963); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Strowd v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 829 (1951); Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
'See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
'Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
" Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

' Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).

* The list of cases involving Black Muslims attempting to assert their
rights while incarcerated has grown rapidly in recent years. See Williford
v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965); Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1
(2d Cir. 1964); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 892 (1964); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U. S. 932 (1964); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 171
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movement, which is familiar to most Americans because of its
separatist social and economic policies and its promotion of militant
Negro racial pride, has profoundly affected internal discipline in
penal institutions by means of zealous efforts to protect its incarcerated members." The movement should not be dismissed, however, as that of a group of militant racists adhering to unorthodox
beliefs and practices. The Black Muslim faith has all the normal
aspects of a religion-including a bible, ministers, temples and parochial schools." As far as can be determined there has been no case
in which a court has refused to recognize the movement as a legitimate religion; at least three courts have held expressly that Black
Muslims do constitute a religious group. 1 2 The numerous petitions
by Muslim prisoners have produced a significant body of decisions
in which the courts have shown themselves willing to inquire into
the possibility of granting relief for inmate grievances under the
constitutional protection of freedom of religion. The basic proposition facing the judiciary in such cases is the delineation of boundaries between the exercise of individual religion and the pragmatic
imposition of penal authority.
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Jones
v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965); Banks v. Havener, 234
F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964); Coleman v. District of Columbia Comm'rs,
234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964); Sewell v. Kennedy, 222 F. Supp. 15
(E.D. Va. 1963); Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963);
Bolden v. Pegelow, 218 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Va. 1963); In re Jones, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962); I- re Ferguson, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361
P.2d 417, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); Bryant v. Wilkins, 265 N.Y.S.2d
995 (App. Div. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 972 (1966); Blazic v. Fay, 251
N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. Div. 1964); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180
N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962). For commentary on Black Muslim
cases see Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 1488 (1962); Comment, 32 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 1124 (1964).
"0Prisoners believing in Islam have installed "kangaroo courts" within
prison walls, Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1964), demanded
special dietary considerations during "Ramadan" (the month of fasting),
Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), and kept special scrapbooks of Muslim materials, In re Ferguson, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d
417 (1961). Muslim prisoners at Leavenworth congregated in the recreation yard for instruction in judo and karate while other inmates were kept
away by "sentries," Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965).
11
LINcOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS IN AMERICA 125-28, 132 (1961).
Muslims are also required to adopt a strict moral code (including puritanical
sexual mores, dietary restrictions, and total abstinence from tobacco and
alcohol) which is often beneficial to prison discipline. Id. at 80-83.
" Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964); Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Bryant v. Wilkins, 265 N.Y.S.2d
995 (App. Div. 1965).
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In Howard v. Smyth 3 a Black Muslim inmate of the Virginia
State Penitentiary sought release from the maximum security unit
where he had been confined for approximately four years. During
July and August of 1962 he had met with the prison chaplain and
an assistant superintendent to ask for worship services for inmates
who embraced the Muslim faith. Following these discussions he was
called before the prison superintendent who heard his request and
demanded the names of the prisoners for whom he spoke. Howard
refused to give the names. He later explained that he feared disciplinary action against the Muslim inmates. The prison superintendent then summarily ordered him confined to the maximum security
unit. Although hearings were customary in such cases, none was
given Howard. The Fourth Circuit, reversing denial of Howard's
petition by the District Court, held that while
prison officials may and should be alert to exercise their legitimate authority to prevent breaches of discipline, even this acknowledged broad authority may not be exercised to discipline a
prisoner who merely expresses for himself and others a desire to
worship according to their religious dictates. 14
Expressing its belief that petitioner was guilty of no misconduct,
the court refused to countenance "the arbitrary imposition of such
serious disciplinary action where the assertedly offensive conduct
bears so close a relationship to First Amendment freedoms."'15
The prison officials contested Howard's right to relief by means
of a dual argument: (1) his confinement in maximum security was
not "punishment," but merely "segregation"; and (2) he was not
placed in security because of his religious beliefs. Acceptance of
the first contention would have placed the administrators' decision
within their acknowledged regulatory authority, thereby destroying
the court's authority to interfere. The court hurdled this obstacle and
reached the broader constitutional issue by looking beyond mere
definitions and holding that the deprivations to which Howard was
subjected by his change in status "cannot be treated as insubstantial."'
365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966).
at 430.
1d. at 431.
18Id. at 430. The
court found that prisoners in the maximum security
unit to which Howard was confined were not permitted to work and earn
money; they were allowed only two meals a day, and were deprived of radio,
television, and movie privileges. They did not have access to the library
1,Id.
5
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The second half of the officials' argument was not dealt with so
directly. By contending that Howard was placed in maximum security only because he refused to divulge the names of the other prisoners who desired Muslim services, the administrators presented the
court with the task of constructing a proper foundation for First
Amendment relief. The officials argued that the nature of the group
represented by Howard was immaterial, because the existence of
any cohesive groups of prisoners within the institution posed a
threat to discipline." In his testimony, the prison superintendent
stated that he would have placed in maximum security any inmate
who came before him requesting privileges for a group if that inmate refused to divulge the group's membership. He further said
that this policy would apply equally to Protestant, Catholic or Jewish
prisoners."8 On the basis of this argument, the District Court had
refused to find a violation of Howard's religious freedom. The
Fourth Circuit thus faced the dilemma of accepting this argument,
or bringing within the purview of the First Amendment Howard's
refusal to divulge the names. The court followed neither course;
rather, it slipped between the horns of the dilemma. The opinion
acknowledges that the sole reason for Howard's confinement was
his refusal to divulge the names, but continues:
If a Protestant or Catholic or Jewish inmate had expressed a desire to worship with others of his faith, there can be little doubt
that the prison officials would have been disposed to honor the
request; and if for any reason this was thought impracticable, it
can hardly be supposed that the mere making of the request or
even the refusal to reveal the identity of other prisoners sharing
in this concern would have led to punishment by years of confinement in the maximum security ward. 19
This conclusion makes no attempt to equate Howard's actions
with his religious beliefs, and it deals only peripherally with the
and were not permitted to attend educational classes. Baths were restricted
to once a week, as opposed to daily baths allowed other prisoners. In addition, the Parole Board declined to hear applications for parole from any
prisoners confined to maximum security. Id. at 429-30.

' At least one court has associated this general fear of intra-institutional
groups with the Black Muslims specifically. "Black Muslim inmates . . .
tend to form themselves into cohesive, disciplined groups, taught to come to

the defense of other Black Muslims and to demand equal punishment with

a brother Muslim who might be disciplined." Jones v. Willingham, 248 F.
Supp. 791, 793 (D. Kan. 1965).
1" Record, pp. 24-25, 27.
" 365 F.2d at 428.
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superintendent's arguments concerning the relationship between the
refusal to give names and general prison discipline. The court simply bypasses these problems and concludes that the inviolability of
a prisoner's religious attitudes demands that they be protected when
the facts allow the conclusion that prison officials are in fact attempting to suppress them, even though they act under the guise of fair
play. This interpretation is substantiated by the court's statement
that petitioner "had been guilty of no misconduct," and by its final
holding that "the only reasonable conclusion is that he is being
arbitrarily punished."" 0
It was not absolutely necessary for this court to avoid an assessment of Howard's refusal to divulge the names of his fellow Muslims in order to grant the relief sought. In Fulwood v. Clernmer21
a district court applied the protection of the eighth amendment to
achieve a similar result. In that case, a Muslim prisoner had engaged in "racial preaching" which the court found was "such as to
be offensive, insulting, and disturbing to white inmates and to nonMuslim negroes and to engender those feelings which tend to menace
order."22 Prison officials placed him in solitary confinement for two
years. Relief was granted under the test formulated by Mr. Justice
Douglas in Robinson v. California:23 the imposition of a deprivation
bearing no reasonable relation to the offense constitutes both a denial
of due process and a cruel and unusual punishment within the ambit
of the eighth amendment. Once the court in Howard had found
that petitioner's special confinement constituted "punishment," the
Douglas test could have been applied to grant relief even if the refusal to divulge names was construed as an offense against prison
discipline. A holding based on this test, however, would have been
decidedly less flexible than a decision grounded in the first amendment, because the eighth amendment lacks the scope necessary to encompass wide varieties of circumstances. But by its willingness to
reach past secondary arguments and protect Howard's religious attitudes from infringements which it considered both substantial and
arbitrary, the court in this case has demonstrated an unequivocal
commitment to the emerging view that the most private of all consti20
Id. at 428.
2 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
22 Id. at 378.
22370

U.S. 660 (1962).
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tutional rights must not be shut off even by the imposing barriers of
prison walls.
H. HUGH STEVENS, JR.

Constitutional Law-The Right to a Bifurcated Trial
Congress, when passing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
recognized the likelihood that prejudice would result when certain
issues were tried together and authorized the federal courts, in a
civil suit, to order the separate trial of any issue to avoid that problem.' It would seem that the need to avoid prejudice in a criminal
proceeding, where the life or liberty of the defendant is at stake, is
even greater, but the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain
no comparable provision.2
The likelihood of this type of prejudice was so great in Holmes
v. United States3 that the defense counsel refused as a matter of
trial tactics to raise the issue of the appellant's insanity at the time
the crime was committed. The appellant, after being convicted, filed
a motion under section 2255 of the Judicial Code4 in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia to have his sentence
vacated alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of his failure to assert the insanity defense.5 Counsel testified
that his experience led him to believe that such a defense would be
a most "impractical approach or request to make of a jury," that a
defense of insanity coupled with a defense on the merits would
jeopardize both defenses, and that there would be great difficulty
"without first admitting to the jury that the defendant Holmes was
guilty of all counts before interjecting a defense of insanity.",,
The appellate court found the "trial counsel's appraisal of the
prejudicial effect of the insanity defense on the defense of not guilty
was entirely reasonable," but that this did not mean that the insanity
defense had to be abandoned. The court pointed out that the de'FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

2 Such procedure would not be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which authorize courts, "If no procedure is specifically
prescribed by rule . . . [to] proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent
with these rules or any specific statute." FED. R. CRim. P. 57(b).
3363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1965) (Statutory equivalent of habeas corpus).
363 F.2d at 281.
Old. at 282.
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fense counsel could have made a motion for a bifurcated trial and
that the district court, to avoid the prejudice, could have submitted
the issue of guilt to the jury before the introduction of the evidence
bearing on the insanity issue. The court stated:
Relevant considerations upon a request for bifurcation include the
substantiality of Appellant's insanity defense and its prejudicial
effect on other defenses. The court not only has a broad discretion considering bifurcation, but also prescribing its procedure
...and

even the impaneling of a second jury to hear the second

stage if this is necessary to eliminate prejudice.7

The court denied retrospective collateral relief in this situation where
the judgment had become final and bifurcation had not been requested at the trial level. It recognized, however, that the issue of
prejudice was a serious one and could be averted in the future if
the remedy of bifurcated trial were "adopted in the sound discretion
'8
of the trial court in the interest of justice."
Although the United States Supreme Court has never considered
the insanity situation presented in Holmes, it has recognized a due
process argument where bifurcation was denied by a trial court in an
analogous situation. In Jackson v. Denno9 the court held that the
New York procedure permitting the same jury to determine both
the issue of guilt and also the voluntariness of a confession was unconstitutional, and that New York must provide the defendant with
an "adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results concerning the voluntariness of his confession" which meets the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 °
No United States Circuit Court of Appeals has ever required a
bifurcated trial in a criminal case, but they have recognized the
utility of the device. In United States v. Curry1 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the power of the trial
court to present the question of guilt to the jury and, after a verdict,
to present to the same jury evidence pertaining to the sentence to be
invoked.12 In Frady v. United States" Judge McGowan, in a concurring opinion, advocated a bifurcated trial where a jury is to de7

Id. at 283.
I1d. at 284.

°378 U.S. 368 (1962).
'Old. at 394.
1358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966).
12 Id. at 915.
'8

348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (reversed on other grounds).
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cide guilt and is also given the responsibility of deciding between a
life sentence and death.14
Only a few states have taken affirmative steps toward providing
for a split verdict or bifurcated trial. California,' 5 Connecticut, 16
New York"7 and Pennsylvania 8 have by statute provided for varied
bifurcation procedures, but not in the insanity situation. These
statutes provide for bifurcation on the issues of guilt and punishment and are limited to capital offenses, usually murder. Louisiana
seems to be the only state that has adopted a bifurcation procedure
and later abandoned it. The Louisiana procedure provided for two
different juries whenever the insanity defense was urged in a capital
case. The reason advanced for doing away with this procedure was
that the smaller parishes had trouble supplying the necessary number
of jurors.'
In so far as can be determined, no state appellate court has,
without statutory authority, found occasion to reverse a trial court
for denying a bifurcated trial. However, a rather complex situation
has developed in Texas due to a court interpretation of a state
statute which provides that a defendant who is insane at the time
of trial cannot be tried until he has recovered from his mental illness. 20 The state courts interpreted this provision as requiring a
separate and preliminary hearing on this issue.2 ' Practical experience showed that the issue of the defendant's present insanity was
usually involved with the issue of whether he was sane at the time
the crime was committed and that a jury trying the issue of the
defendant's present insanity might also render a verdict on his sanity
at the time of the crime.2 2 Article 521 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure still expressly provides that evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime is admissible under a plea
of "not guilty." The result is that two different juries pass on the
defendant's sanity and if either finds him insane at the time of the
,Id. at 91.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv.

§ 53-10 (Supp. 1965).
§§ 1045, 1045a (Supp. 1966).
18 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
'7 N.Y. PEN. LAW

"Bennett, Louisiaza Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal 14 LA.
L. REv. 11 (1953).
"TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 46.02 (1965).
" Morgan v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 76, 117 S.W.2d 76 (1938).
Id. at 78, 177 S.W.2d at 77.
2
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crime he is not guilty. 23 Most states have such a provision regarding
the trial of a defendant who is insane at the time of trial, but it is
not likely that any other state court would extend it to require a
bifurcated trial as the Texas Courts did.
The issue of a bifurcated trial as presented in appellant's motion
for collateral relief in Holmes can be expected to become a more
frequent issue at the trial stage. A strong argument can be made
that the denial of bifurcation in such a situation amounts to a denial
of due process similar to the situation in regard to the voluntariness
of confessions. This would seem to be especially true where the
evidence bearing on the insanity issue operates practically as a confession to the commission of the act. For example, suppose a defendant is charged with murder and he urges the insanity defense and
testifies that he had an irresistible impulse to kill the deceased or
that he had heard auditory hallucinations which he believed to be
the voice of God commanding him to kill the deceased victim. It
would seem apparent that after a jury had found the defendant sane,
this testimony could have no other effect than to convince the jury
that he actually committed the crime. Even in situations where the
evidence bearing on sanity has little or no relation to the subsequent
issue of commission of the act, it would still seem to be highly
prejudicial if the defense attempts to meet the burden of showing
by expert testimony, voiced as hypothetical questions and answers,
that the alleged insanity had a causal connection with the crime
committed.
It is submitted that the authority to order a bifurcated trial
should rest in the wide discretion of the trial court. But, as where
similar discretionary functions are involved, the denial of such a
motion, where there is substantial evidence of insanity and sufficient
likelihood that the defendant will be prejudiced, should constitute
reversible error readily rectified by the appellate courts.2 4
BILLY R. BARR
Pena v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 406, 320 S.W.2d 355 (1959). However,
the court held that there was no right of appeal from the preliminary
hearing.
" It should be noted that the argument for setting the judgment aside in
Holnies was based on the supposition that defense counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance. Where reversal is sought on the grounds that the
trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing the motion for bifurcation
would the District of Columbia Circuit Court require more certainty that
prejudice would result from the denial and/or greater substantiality of evidence pertaining to insanity to warrant reversal?

CONTEMPT OF COURT
Contempt of Court-Recent, Developments
Historically, criminal contempt has been considered to be sui
generis in that it is not a crime but is punishable by criminal sanctions.' However, in recent years a minority of the United States
Supreme Court has comprehensively challenged the constitutionality
of summary proceedings in criminal contempt. In Green v. United
States' and United States v. Barnett' the dissenters, led by Justices
Black and Douglas, argued that criminal contempts are crimes within the meaning of the Constitution and require a jury trial. In three
recent cases the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to limit the
extent of the contempt power but they have not, as yet, based their
decisions on the Constitution.
In Harris v. United States4 petitioner was granted immunity
from prosecution by the district court and directed to answer the
questions of a grand jury. After his refusal before the grand jury,
and subsequently before the district court, the district judge, acting
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42(a)," summarily adjudged Harris guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced
him to one year in jail.
In a five-to-four decision the Supreme Court reversed and reBessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904).
'356 U.S. 165 (1958).
'376 U.S. 681 (1964).
'382 U.S. 162 (1965).
'FED. R. CRIm. P. 42
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and
shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing
a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state
the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in
open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for
that purpose, by an order to show cause or any order of arrest. The
defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of
Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided
in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or
criticism of the judge, that judge is disqtualified from presiding at the
trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict
or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
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manded, and in doing so expressly overruled Brown v. United
States." The Court held that Harris was entitled to notice and hearing as provided for in Rule 42(b)7 because summary disposition
under Rule 42(a) is appropriate only in "unusual circumstances"
occurring in the "actual presence of the court."
Although the Court held that the contempt was committed before the grand jury and, therefore, not in the "actual presence" of
the Court,' the basis of the Court's decision seems to be the limitation of Rule 42 (a) to "unusual circumstances." The Court argued
that even if "we assume arguendo" that Rule 42(a) may at times
reach testimonial episodes,9 the actions of Harris did not necessitate
summary punishment under Rule 42 (a). The Court appears to be
saying that even if the "actual presence" requirement is satisfied,
the conduct of the contemnor must pose "an open threat to the
orderly procedure of the court"" that necessitates "immediate penal
vindication of the dignity of the court."' 1 The facts in Harris do
not indicate a serious threat to the court's orderly procedure and
thus it was appropriate to afford him the procedural regularity and
the procedural safeguards of Rule 42(b).
In Cheff v. Schnackenberg12 petitioner was held in criminal contempt for having aided and abetted his company in violating a
pendente lite order. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
after denying the demand for a jury trial, found Cheff guilty of
359 U.S. 41 (1959). See note 8 infra.
' See note 5 supra.

In Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), under identical facts,

the court had held that Rule 42(a) was the proper procedure because the

grand jury is but an appendage of the court, dependent on the court to
compel the testimony of witnesses. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1966),
federal courts have the power to punish criminal contempt committed in
the "presence" of the court. Rule 42(a) requires "actual presence" for summary disposition. The requirement of "presence" under § 401 (1) has been
broadly construed and held applicable to misbehavior in the grand jury
room, Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 213 (1st Cir. 1954). Therefore, it seems that under § 401(1) the court in Harris had the power to
punish the contemnor for his contemptuous act in the grand jury room.
But since the court held that the real contempt was before the grand jury,
even though the district court had the power to punish the contempt, the
contemnor was entitled to the procedural regularity afforded in Rule 42(b).
'If Harris had refused to go before the grand jury and answer their
questions, this would have been criminal contempt in the actual presence of
the court and arguably could have been punished summarily.
10 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1924).
1
. Ibid.
1 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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criminal contempt and imposed a six-month sentence. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether, after
denial of a demand for a jury trial, a six-month sentence is permissible under article III and the sixth amendment of the Constitution.
In a four-Justice ruling 8 the Court held that the sixth amendment did not require a jury trial in a proceeding that resulted only
in a six-month sentence, the maximum permitted here for "petty
offenses." However, in the interest of effective administration of
the federal courts, the Court ruled that under their supervisory
power' 4 criminal contempt sentences exceeding six months may not
be imposed unless there has been a jury trial or waiver thereof."
Petitioner's chief contention was that criminal contempt proceedings are crimes within the meaning of article III, § 2' and the
sixth amendment 7 regardless of whether they can be classified as
petty offenses. In United States v. Barnett 8 the Court was superficially in accord with the precedents represented by a one-hundredand-fifty-year-line of cases in holding that contempt is not a "crime"
or "criminal prosecution." However, footnote twelve in Barnett, by
way of dictum, indicated that summary disposition without a jury
would be constitutionally limited to the penalty provided for petty
offenses. 9 But, because this statement was contained in a terse,
unexplained footnote, it was not certain how the dictum was to be
applied. The opinion of the Court in Cheff adds little to the Barnett
"3 This four-Justice ruling affirming the contempt conviction, was made
effective by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, in which Mr.
Justice Stewart joined. Their concurrence was based on Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), where it was held that a jury trial is never
constitutionally required in criminal contempt cases. Mr. Justice Douglas,
with Mr. Justice Black concurring in the dissent, adhered to their previous
argument that jury trials are constitutionally required in all criminal contempt cases.
14 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1965).
"The trial of all Crimes except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
17 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18376 U.S. 681 (1964).
19 The text of the footnote states: "Some members of the Court are of
the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment
by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that
penalty provided for petty offenses." United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681,
695 n.12 (1964).
18
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dictum other than strengthening the petty offense distinction by
referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), which declares that an offense,
the penalty for which does not exceed six months, is a petty offense.
In the consolidated cases of Shillitani v. United States" and
Pappadio v. United States2l petitioners refused to answer the questions of a grand jury after they had been ordered to answer by the
district court. The district court found them guilty of criminal contempt in proceedings under Rule 42(b) and sentenced them to two
years imprisonment with the proviso that they would be released
sooner if and when they answered the questions of the grand jury.
The court of appeals in construing the sentence as conditional, with
the right of release upon compliance, rejected the constitutional objections that they were not indicted or given a jury trial. The
Supreme Court with only Justice Harlan dissenting, limited the civil
contempt sentences to the life of the grand jury. The basis for this
decision was the Court's finding that the conditional nature of the
sentences made this a civil proceeding for which indictment and
jury trial are not constitutionally required.
The limitations imposed on the contempt power by the above
cases reflect the influence of Justices Black and Douglas. But these
cases also show the Court's intention to avoid constitutional problems. In Harristhe Court, by reading the requirement of "unusual
circumstances" into Rule 42(b), extended the minimal procedural
due process protections of Rule 42(b) without basing their decision
on the Constitution. In Cheff, the Court provided jury trials for
criminal contempts in federal courts resulting in sentences of more
than six months. This decision appears to be an important step in
guaranteeing criminal contemnors the procedural protections of the
Constitution. But, unlike the dictum in Barnett, the Court bases
their decision on the supervisory power of the Court and thus indicates that they are not yet ready to accept Justice Black's and Justice
Douglas's classification of contempt as a crime within the meaning
of the Constitution. In the civil contempt area, as represented by
Shillitani, summary commitment of civil contempt has gone unchallenged by the Supreme Court. Even such vigorous activists as Justices Black and Douglas have not questioned the constitutionality of
0 384
2

U.S. 364 (1966).
1Ibid.
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summary proceedings in civil contempt. The basis for this appears
to be in the wording of the Constitution restricting application of
article III, § 223 and the sixth amendment 4 to crimes and criminal
prosecution respectively.
Therefore, it appears that the court is adhering to the argument
that criminal contempt is sui generis and, since it is not a crime,
does not require a jury trial within the meaning of article III, § 2
and the sixth amendment, viewed as of the time of the adoption
of the Constitution. Justices Black and Douglas argue that the
nature of the contempt power has undergone substantial change
since the adoption of the Constitution and the Court should not
hesitate to re-evaluate the contempt power in light of the "incredible
transformation and growth" it has undergone.25 This growth is
demonstrated by the numerous situations in which the contempt
power is now used and by the severity of the punishments that are
being imposed.
These cases impose serious restrictions on the use of the contempt power but they do not clear up the confusion that surrounds
the contempt area. The tests used by the Court to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt and to determine whether a jury
trial is to be granted only compound the existing confusion.
The courts have often addressed themselves to the problem of
satisfactorily distinguishing civil from criminal contempts.26 The
distinction is more than academic since all civil contempts are punished summarily. The Court in Shillitani looked at the character
and purpose of the proceeding to determine whether the contempt
was civil or criminal. But the character and purpose of the proceeding as a whole must be correlated with the nature of the penalty.2 7 Where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is
"intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he
22 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958)
(opinion of Black,
J. dissenting). They are inclined, however, to construe contempt as criminal
rather than as civil to insure the procedural safeguards of Rule 42(b). See
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
22 See note 16 supra.
*'See note 17 supra.
22 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 208 (1958)
(opinion of Black, J.
dissenting).
2

See generally Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13

SYRAcusE L. REv. 44, 46-58 (1961).

"'Penfield v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 585, 596 (1947).
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had refused to do," 2 the remedy is one for civil contempt. Where
the sentence is punitive in its nature and imposed for the purpose
of vindicating the authority of the court, the remedy is one for
criminal contempt. 29 In Shillitani, the Court determined that the
purpose of the proceeding was remedial by noting the presence of a
purge clause. In turn, the purpose of the proceeding was a factor
in determining the character of the proceeding. Therefore, although
the Court was successful in correlating the character of the penalty
with the character of the proceeding, the relief and procedure available to the contemnor became dependent, to some extent, upon the
sentence imposed. Since the procedural rights attached to civil and
criminal contempt are so different, this retrospective determination
of the character of the proceeding may deprive the contemnor of
his due process rights.
The Cheff decision indicates that the only criteria in determining
whether a jury trial is to be granted is the severity of the sentence
actually imposed. The dissenters in both Barnett and Cheff recognized that the length of the sentence should not be the only factor
considered as this distinction is not supported by cases in the contempt field, nor in the field of petty offenses. Cases interpreting the
petty offense exception to the jury trial requirement based their
decision on the nature of the offense and the maximum potential
sentence."0 The Court in Cheff has set up an arbitrary distinction
which requires the judge to know the evidence to be presented before the proceeding has actually begun.
It is apparent from these cases and the tests they set forth that
the courts approach each case in an ad hoc manner and fail to connect their decision "with any body of law or legal principle." 3 ' An
effective way to resolve the confusion in this area would be to treat
both civil and criminal contempt alike. It does not appear that coercion is substantially different from punishment. In either case they
may be mitigating circumstances that explain the contemnor's actions. It is submitted that the procedural safeguards available to the
contemnor should not depend upon the purpose of the proceeding as
the severity of the penalty and the stigma attached to those convicted
28 Gompers v.
'0 Id. at 441.

Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).

Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 387 (1966).
Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SxiAcusa L. REv.
44, 56 (1961).
20
21
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of the offense may be the same whether it be a civil or criminal
proceeding.
FRANCIS

X.

HANLON

Insurance-Statutory Definition of an Uninsured Motor Vehicle
When the Liability Insurer is Insolvent or Denies Coverage
North Carolina General Statute section 20-279.21 defines a motor
vehicle liability policy, contains certain requirements for provisions
of owner's and operator's policies, and includes certain provisions
to which such policies will be subject even though not contained in
the policy. It provides that unless such coverage is rejected by the
insured, no owner's policy shall be issued without coverage for the
protection of the persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles. The practical effect of this latter provision is that when a
motorist driving what is determined under the statute to be an
"uninsured motor vehicle" negligently injures another motorist
covered by liability insurance with uninsured motorists coverage, the
injured motorist can be compensated for his injuries up to the limits
stated in the policy by his own liability insurer under that uninsured
motorists coverage.
A question immediately arises. What is an "uninsured motor
vehicle?" In 1965 the North Carolina General Assembly undertook
to provide certain definitions of the term which had not been previously defined in the statute itself.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held in 1965 that a vehicle
was uninsured when the liability of the negligent party causing the
accident was not covered by the policy issued on the vehicle.' This
decision was made without the benefit of the statutory definition of
an uninsured motor vehicle.
After the amendments, North Carolina General Statute section
20-279.21(b) (3) provided that "under this section the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall include, but not be limited to, an insured
motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make
'Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34
(1965). The liability of the negligent party was not covered by the policy
because he was driving the vehicle without the permission, knowledge or
consent of the named insured.
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Also,

"[flor the purpose of this section, an 'uninsured motor vehicle'
shall be a motor vehicle as to which there is

. .

. [liability insurance

in at least the amounts specified in North Carolina General Statute
section 20-279.5(c) ]2 . . . but the insurance company writing the

same denies coverage thereunder, or has become bankrupt...
(Emphasis added.)
In Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.4 plaintiff's automobile was
insured under a bodily injury and property damage liability insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company. The policy
contained a rider affording protection against personal injuries and
property damage resulting from the negligent operation of an uninsured motor vehicle by another motorist. In 1962 plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident resulting from the negligence of
a motorist whose automobile was covered by liability insurance.
Subsequent to the accident the negligent motorist's insurer became
insolvent. Although this situation seems to fall squarely within the
statute, our court held that plaintiff could not obtain compensation
from his own liability insurer under the uninsured motor vehicle
endorsement since the negligent party's vehicle was not uninsured.5
2 The amounts specified are $5000 because of bodily injury or death of
one person in any one accident, $10,000 because of bodily injury or death to
two or more persons in any one accident, and $5000 for damage of property
of others in any one accident.
' Under the amendment further definitions of an "uninsured motor
vehicle" are: (1) a vehicle as to which there is no liability insurance in at
least the amounts required by statute; or no bond or deposit of securities in
lieu of such insurance; (2) a vehicle the owner of which has not qualified
as a self-insurer; and (3) a vehicle not subject to the provisions of the
Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act. However, the term
does not include: (1) a motor vehicle owned by the named insured; (2) a
motor vehicle owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of
any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any
similar law; (3) a motor vehicle owned by the United States, Canada, a
state, or any agency of these, but excluding political subdivisions thereof;
(4) a land motor vehicle or trailer, if operated on rails or crawler treads
or while located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vehicle; and
(5) a farm type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off public
roads, except while actually upon public roads. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21
(b)(3) (Supp. 1965).
'267 N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223 (1966).
'But cf. North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264
(1964) where the Court held that when the receiver of the insolvent insurer
lacked sufficient funds to continue defense of the action against the insured's
administratrix, it had effectively denied coverage, and under a statute defining an uninsured motor vehicle as one where the liability insurer denies
coverage, the negligent party's vehicle was uninsured; State Farm Mut.
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The court said:
The fact that [the negligent party's liability insurer] . .. was,

subsequent to the collision causing damage to the plaintiff, placed
in receivership because of insolvency did not render defendant
[plaintiff's liability insurer] liable on the policy issued plaintiff.
Such insolvency did not make the... [negligent party's vehicle]
...an uninsured automobile. 6
The court relied for authority on Hardinv. American Mut. Fire
Ins. Co.7 decided in 1964 on similar facts and reaching the same
result as Rice.
In a case decided subsequent to the Hardin decision and to the
amendments, the court said, "It is noted that G.S. § 20-279.21 (b)
(3)

was amended ... so as to preclude the result reached by this

court in Hardin v. American Fire Insurance Company."' However,
the result in Hardin was reached again in Rice.
The amendments were raised in briefs by counsel for both sides.
Counsel for defendant appellant insurance company argued that since
the accident occurred before the statute was amended, it did not
provide coverage to the plaintiff in this case.' Counsel for plaintiff
appellee argued that since the act was to be in full force from and
after its ratification and did not provide that it should affect pending litigation, the statute governed the insurance company's liability
to plaintiff under the uninsured motor vehicle endorsement.' 0
The result is at least questionable. For a fair resolution of the
interests of the injured plaintiff and his insurer from whom he seeks
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964) where the
Court held, under a similar statute, that since the insolvent insurer did not

appear or defend the suit against its negligent insured, nor pay the judgment, it had denied coverage thereby making the negligent party's vehicle
uninsured.
6267 N.C. at 424, 148 S.E.2d at 225.
'261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964). The court relied on Federal Ins.
Co. v. Speight, 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.S.C. 1963) where the judge noted that
the South Carolina statute defining an uninsured motor vehicle had been
amended after the accident occurred to include a vehicle covered by liability
insurance from an insolvent carrier, but without discussion did not apply it to
the parties; and Uline v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d
1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961); accord, Swaringin v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
397 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).,
"Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 290, 144 S.E.2d
34, 37 (1965) (dictum).
"Brief for Appellant, p. 18, Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 267 N.C.
421, 148 S.E.2d 223 (1966).
"' Brief for Appellee, p. 15.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

compensation, the court should have discussed and decided whether
or not the amendment applied retroactively. On its face, the statute
would clearly apply to any case such as Rice in which the accident
occurred after the amendments in 1965.
As stated above, North Carolina General Statute section 20279.21(b) (3) now provides by virtue of the amendment that an
"uninsured motor vehicle" for the purpose of that section is a
motor vehicle as to which there is liability insurance in at least the
amounts required by statute, but the insurer writing it "denies
coverage thereunder."
This provision makes a judicial definition of the term "denies
coverage" necessary. The cases available in other jurisdictions with
similar provisions lay down only broad guidelines to aid in defining
the term.
A New York statute, operating upon the same principle as that
of North Carolina, provides protection for the injured party when
the liability insurer of the negligent party has "disclaimed liability
or denied coverage because of some act or omission of [the negligent
party] ....

,"" "To deny coverage is to take the position that for

some reason or other the policy does not encompass the particular
accident."- 2 A disclaimer of liability occurs where the insurer refuses to respond because of some act of the insured, not directly
connected with the accident itself, such as lack of cooperation, fraud,
3
or giving late notice of the accident.'
A disclaimer of liability under the New York view apparently
would not be applicable in North Carolina to a carrier registered to
do business in the state since by statute a violation of the liability
policy by the insured will not void the policy, 4 nor under the North
Carolina view, prevent the injured party from recovering from the
insurer if the negligent insured's liability has been established.' 5
It has been held in New York that there was a denial of coverN.Y. INs.
LAW § 608(c).
v. Motor
Vehicle Acc. Indemn. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005,
213 1N.Y.S.2d
871,
874
(Sup. Ct. 1961) (dictum).
Id. at 1005, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
"N.C. Gmq. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (1) (Supp. 1965) provides that "The
1U
Uline

liability of the insurance carrier . . . shall become absolute whenever injury
or damage . . . occurs; . . . no statement made by the insured or on
his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat or void said policy .... "
1 Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960); accord, Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d
398 (1962) (insurance issued under an assigned risk policy).
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age when the insurer notified the injured party that there was "no
liability on its policy" because the insured had loaned his automobile
to the party who had negligently caused the injuries while driving
it.'" On the other hand, there is no denial of coverage (or disclaimer of liability) where the liability insurer did not answer inquiries
of the injured party's attorney for eight and one-half months.' 7
Also, there is not a denial of coverage where the liability insurer
denied liability because the policy had expired before the accident,' 8
terminated for non-payment of premiums prior to the accident, 9 or.
been cancelled before the accident."0 Of course in these latter three
instances, the vehicle would be uninsured in North Carolina since
there was no applicable liability policy in effect.
Other jurisdictions with statutory provisions similar to that of
North Carolina concerning denial of coverage have spoken on the
matter. The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that when the
liability insurer expressly denied coverage to its insured because of
misstatements in his application, his automobile became an uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute.2 ' The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that a motor vehicle became uninsured under the terms of its statute when the liability
insurer denied coverage because the insured failed to cooperate with
2
the insured in the suit against the insured by the injured party.
Under the North Carolina view, the insurers in these two cases
apparently could not deny coverage when faced with a suit by an
injured party who has recovered a judgment against the insured
if they were registered to do business in the state, and if the policy
had been issued in the state. North Carolina General Statute section
20-279.21 (f) (1) (Supp. 1965), providing that no statement by or
for the insured and no violation of the policy will defeat that policy,
" Rivera v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 201,

254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1964), inotion for leave to appeal denied, 15

N.Y.2d 485, 206 N.E.2d 363, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1965). .
'Application of DeStefano, 34 Misc. 2d 68, 228 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
"Brucker v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 281, 245
N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
':Application of Johnson, 218 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1961)..
' Arculin v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 232 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
21 Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673
(1965).
' McDaniel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d
806 (1965).
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applies only to insurance companies duly authorized to transact business in North Carolina.2" However, these cases could be applicable
(1) where the insurer who avoided making payment was not registered to do business in North Carolina and its insured was a non-resident, 4 and (2) where the insurance policy was issued in another
state to a resident of that state, in which case the rights and obligations of the parties would be fixed by the laws of that other state.25
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not specifically defined
the term "denies coverage" as it applies to the recently amended
statute. However, it has used the term "deny coverage" to describe
action of a liability insurer when it desired to avoid payment on
the policy on the ground that the vehicle (a tractor-trailer unit) its
insured was driving was not an "automobile" within the terms of
the policy, and therefore the policy did not provide coverage.2" It
has said that the refusal of a liability insurer to defend an action
27
against its insured "was tantamount to a denial of liability."
Where the liability insurer sought to avoid payment alleging that
the vehicle involved in the accident was excluded from the coverage
28
of the policy, the court said that the insurer had "denied liability."
The action of the insurers in these cases should place the vehicle
involved in the category of an "uninsured motor vehicle" under the
statute.
"See notes 14-15 supra.
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.20 (Supp. 1965) provides that the "non-

resident owner of a motor vehicle not registered in this State may give
proof of financial responsibility by filing with the Commissioner [of Motor
Vehicles] a written certificate . . . of an insurance carrier authorized to
transact business in the state in which the motor vehicle ...is registered...."
The commissioner shall accept that certificate upon the condition that the
insurance carrier agrees in writing that the policy shall be deemed to conform
with the laws of North Carolina with respect to the terms of motor vehicle
liability policies issued in the state. Presumably, if such an insurance carrier
does not want to pay on the policy because of a violation of a condition
by the insured, and does not agree that its policy will conform to the laws
of the state, there is no way to compel it to pay in North Carolina, assuming
its refusal to pay is justified, and the injured party would be deprived of
any protection by insurance unless he could collect upon his own liability
insurance under the uninsured motorists coverage.
" Conner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 188, 143 S.E.2d
98 (1965).
" Seaford v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 719, 724, 117 S.E.2d
733, 737, 85 A.L.R.2d 496, 501 (1961).
" Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 499, 502, 135 S.E.2d
209, 211 (1964).
"8Kirk v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 651, 654, 119 S.E.2d 645,

647 (1961).

1967]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - •

557

It has been said that "[u]ninsured motorists coverage 'is designed to further close the gaps inherent in the motor vehicle financial responsibility and compulsory insurance legislation.' "29 Such a
"gap" certainly occurs when a motorist, driving a vehicle supposedly
covered by liability insurance, negligently injures another party, insured under uninsured motorists coverage, and the negligent party's
liability insurer refuses to pay the injured party on the ground that
the policy did not cover the vehicle, the driver, or the type of accident involved. The vehicle involved should then be considered "uninsured" within the terms of the statute because the liability insurer
has denied coverage, thus enabling the injured party to collect upon
his uninsured motorists coverage. Such a result fits the judicially
stated purpose of our statutory scheme of compulsory liability insurance "to provide protection, within the required limits, to persons
injured or damaged by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle .... 30
If a vehicle is uninsured when there is no liability policy at all or
when the liability insurer is insolvent, then it should be uninsured
when the liability insurer will not pay. The effect in each instance
is to deprive the injured person of the protection afforded by liability
insurance contrary to the principle of protection for all innocent
motorists provided by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Act.
PENDER R. McELROY

Labor Law-Collective Bargaining-Is the Court Replacing
the Union
Labor-management disputes in railroad operations are regulated
by the Railway Labor Act.1 It provides for negotiation, 2 mediation,3 voluntary arbitration,4 and fact finding.5 However, the ulti" Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 265 N.C. 285, 288, 144 S.E.2d
34, "0
36Swain
(1965).v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 126, 116 S.E.2d 482,
487 (1960).
144 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).
264 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1964).
S78 Stat. 748, 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
'48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
63 Stat. 107 (1949), 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
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mate weapon of "self-help" is preserved. Management is permitted
to hire replacements, make unilateral thanges, 7 and the unions can
strike. But in a nationwide emergency, Congress can and has substituted compulsory arbitration for self-help in a labor dispute.'
The ultimate form of union self-help is the right to strike, but
it is not without limitations. Strikes such as "sit-downs" 9 and
"mutinies"' 0 are prohibited. Furthermore, if the strike is for economic reasons, the jobs of strikers are forfeited if permanent strike
replacements are hired."
The employer, as well, may resort to self-help when good faith
collective bargaining fails. 2 He may hire strike replacements to
keep his business operative 3 or "shut-down"' 4 at a time of his own
choosing. But here again limitations are imposed. Employer sympathy lock-outs 5 and super seniority privileges' 6 are examples of
prohibited measures.
The availability of self-help however, does not terminate the
bargaining relationship. It is still unlawful for the employer to
make unilateral changes in terms of conditions of employment and
he must negotiate with the union in regards to pay rates and working conditions of strike replacements.'
The recent case of Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida
East Coast Ry.' 8 represents an inroad into the aforementioned labormanagement concepts of self-help, at least in the context of railroad
' See note 27 infra.
TIn

NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the

employer hired replacements to operate his business and was not required to
discharge them on return of the participants in an economic strike.
'E.g., Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, in which Congress provided
for a special arbitration board to establish conditions that would be in effect
for a two-year period, thus avoiding a threatened nationwide railroad union

strike. See Brief for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen as

Appellant, pp. 4-5, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineman v.
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
F.2d Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 'E.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
1"See
"1See note 7 supra.
1 See note 27 infra.

" Note 7 supra.
300 (1965).
" American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
for the proposition that a
1" See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965),

lockout based on hostility to the process of collective bargaining would be
illegal.
18 See note 37 infra.
1 See note 36 infra.
18384 U.S. 238 (1966).
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operations. The labor unions,"' on behalf of nonoperating employees,2 0 demanded a general twenty-five-cents-per-hour wage increase
and six months notice of prospective lay-offs and job terminations.
This demand was made of virtually all Class One railroads, including the defendant.
Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act negotiation and mediation
ensued but no agreement was reached. A presidential emergency
board 1 was then created to conduct hearings and make settlement
recommendations. Its efforts were successful with respect to all railroads concerned except Florida East Coast.
Subsequent to the failure.of defendant and the unions to come
to terms, the latter struck and defendant hired replacement workers.2 2 In so doing, new contracts that were at variance with the
existing collective agreements in respect to wages and notice were
negotiated with the replacements. Florida East Coast further attempted to nullify the previous union-negotiated agreements by substituting new contracts that embodied additional departures. These
were foreign to the union agreements in particulars other than those
that were the initial subject of dispute. The new agreements were
challenged by the United States as violative of the Railway Labor
Act.2 3 The ensuing litigation resulted in a decision that the railroad
The unions referred to are a group of eleven cooperating labor organizations representing workers employed by the railroad. Brief for Petitioner,
p. 4 .
" Employees in "so-called non-operating crafts-clerks, machinists, etc."
Id. at 4 n.1.
" § 160, providing for the board, states in part:
If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not adjusted under
the foregoing provisions of this chapter and should, in the judgment
of the Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country
of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify
the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board
to investigate and report respecting such dispute....
After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such
board has made its report to the President, no change, except by
agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the
conditions out of which the dispute arose.
48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
12 For a time, the railroad ceased operations altogether as a result of the
strike. This was prior to the hiring of the replacements in question.
"The segment of the act in question was 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152, Seventh (1964) which provides:
No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in
agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or
in section 156 of this title.
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had violated the act by this unilateral action. But it was held that
the railroad could institute changes if they were first submitted to a
court and found to be "reasonably necessary to effectuate its rights
to continue to run its railroad under the strike conditions." 2 4 This
in effect, opened the way for defendant to secure proposed contractual changes by court approval without resorting to further
negotiation with the union. Such changes could encompass areas
that had not heretofore been the subject of a union-management
25
dispute.
The Supreme Court approved this approach, including the "reasonably necessary" criteria enunciated by the lower court. The union
contended that the only changes Florida East Coast could legitimately make in formulating the replacement worker agreements
were those that had previously been submitted to negotiation as
required by the act. This proposition was rejected on the basis that
if the mediation procedure was invoked for every individual change
deemed necessary during a strike, the carrier would be crippled. In
addition, the Court felt that the union proposal would prevent the
48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964) provides;

Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least
thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place
for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the
parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within
ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within
the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice

of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held
with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have
been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered
by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as
required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless
a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences
without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.
' Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d
172, 182 (5th Cir. 1964). Subsequent to this decision the district court
allowed the alterations enumerated in note 25 infra. This was affirmed in
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 348 F.2d 682
(5th Cir. 1965) and precipitated the present holding.
" The district court had permitted Florida East Coast:
to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and age limitations
established by the collective bargaining agreement to contract out
certain work, and to use supervisory personnel to perform specified
jobs where it appeared that trained personnel were unavailable.
384 U.S. at 243.
It must be remembered that the subject of the original negotiations was
wages and notice. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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railroad from making a "reasonable effort" 20 to continue operations
during the strike and thereby constitute a breach of public duty on
the part of the carrier. In fact, the duty of the railroad to the
public appeared to be the Court's major concern. It discussed the
potential disaster of a general shutdown of service and stated that
the carrier's right of self-help17 would be meaningless if the already
cumbersome negotiation procedure was extended.
Given that the public interest in uninterrupted carrier service is
substantial and that the present ruling will protect that interest, what
of the public interest in the protection of organized labor? It is
submitted that Congress was well aware of the vital nature of railway transportation at the time the act was passed." As the right
to strike was not prohibited, it would seem that union equities were
considered a substantial public interest. Moreover, as pointed out
by the dissent of Mr. Justice White, the act does not call for compulsory arbitration of disputes,2 9 a measure that would virtually
insure continued carrier operation in the face of labor-management
disagreements. In addition, there is no absolute duty on the carrier
to continue service; only a reasonable effort is required. 30 Thus it
is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to negate the
effectiveness of a strike where the railroad is concerned, though admittedly desiring to encourage settlements by protracted negotiation
procedures in hopes that a strike would be unnecessary.
Although it is uncertain what contractual changes a court may
find "reasonably necessary" in a particular fact situation, the potenoThe Court did not consider the duty of the carrier to operate absolute,
but stated that the railroad:
owes the public reasonable efforts to maintain public service at all
times, even when beset by labor-management controversies and that
this duty continues even when all the mediation provisions of the Act
have been exhausted and self-help becomes available to both sides
of the labor-management controversy.
Id. at 245.
7 The Court referred to Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963), as authority for the proposition
that self-help is available to both parties to a dispute when statutory procedures have failed to result in settlement. 384 U.S. at 244. Of course, the
strike is the union method of exercising this right.
28 May 20, 1926 was the date of initial enactment.
" It provides for voluntary arbitration but specifically states, "The failure
or refusal of either party to submit a controversy to arbitration shall not
be construed as a violation of any legal obligation imposed upon such party
by the terms of this chapter or otherwise." 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45
U.S.C.
§ 157,
(1964).
"0See
note First
26 supra.
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tial danger to union bargaining power is significant. As the purpose
of a strike is application of economic pressure to management, it
must hamper management activity to be of any consequence. Assuming that a railroad is able to convince a court that sweeping
changes are necessary to effectively operate under strike conditions,
the inconvenience of changing personnel might be the single major
obstacle that management would face. Any expense incurred thereby
would be overshadowed by the pecuniary consequences of yielding
to substantial union demands for wage increases and alterations of
working conditions.
The knowledge that collective agreements that were in effect
prior to the strike would remain the standard contracts and return
to prominence at the conclusion of the dispute"' would be little consolation from the union viewpoint. As dissatisfaction with existing
arrangements is the primary motive for strikes, a return to the same
would not justify the effort. In fact, labor would suffer more than
management as participating rank and file would be unemployed
during the strike while management continues to function with relative ease. The mere prospect of such an occurrence will constitute
a deterrent to union activity, though in the final analysis a court
may not agree that management demands were "reasonably necessary."
As to enforcement of this "reasonably necessary" standard, the
Court in this case stated that it must be strictly construed and:
The carrier must respect the continuing status of the collective
bargaining agreement and make only those changes as are truly
necessary in light of the inexperience and lack of training of the
new labor force or the lesser number of employees available for
the continued operation.3 2,
It is submitted that the above does not constitute a standard that
is susceptible of strict construction. The necessities, as seen by a
court faced with such determination, will depend upon various factual issues that may not fit into a neat pattern. Moreover, the
language quoted would seem to indicate a balance in favor of the
collective agreements that a carrier must overcome. 33 But consider1

The collective agreements were to constitute the basic framework upon
the court approved changes would be tacked. See note 33 infra.
which
32384 U.S. at 248.
"The Court stated that "the burden is on the carrier to show the need
for any alteration . . . that it is required to employ in order to maintain
that continuity of operation that the law requires of it." Id. at 248.
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ing the Court's emphasis on the plight of the railroad undertaking
"to keep its vital services going with a substantially different labor
force,"34 the balance disappears. The carrier will be operating with
a substantially different labor force in every strike situation where
contractual changes are sought. Furthermore, it is unlikely that replacements, as a group, will ever have the training and railroad orientation of employees for whose benefit the collective agreements were
tailored. 35 Thus the union is faced with the prospect of management
having a built-in argument in support of its contentions.
If wholesale changes do result from such a process, what of the
right of the union "to represent all employees in the craft irregardless of union membership"3 as enunciated by the Court? This
phrase is without substance if the union is unable to make a showing
of strength during the crucial strike period. Such showing would be
evidenced by a continued adherence to existing collective agreements.
With the railroad now able to appeal to the courts for extensive
alteration of these agreements, can it be said that union representation is not thereby undermined ?
84 Id. at 245.
" The Court emphasized that the qualifications of replacements are unlikely to blend with "the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, drafted
to meet the sophisticated requirements of a trained and professional labor
force." Id. at 246.
"' The Court refers to Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) in which it was stated:
The labor organization chosen to be the representative of the craft
or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members,
regardless of their union affiliations or want of them.... The purpose
of providing for a representative is to secure those benefits for those
who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of the
benefits of collective bargaining for the advantage of the representative or those members of the craft who selected it.
Id. at 200-01.
" In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), replacement
workers hired during a strike were given "20 years additional seniority
. . . which would be available only for credit against future layoffs and
which could not be used for other employee benefits based on years of
service." Id. at 223. The same benefits were accorded strikers who returned to work.
The Court evidenced concern for continuing union strength in strike
situations by declaring the seniority gambit an unfair labor practice. In
regard to management claims that such action was taken in pursuit of legitimate business purposes, the Court stated:
Nevertheless, his conduct does speak for itself-it is discriminating
and it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed
overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have
intended.
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Furthermore, it is far from certain that the effect of the present
holding will be confined to union activity within the purview of the
Railway Labor Act. Neither the Court38 nor the National Labor
Relations Board39 has hesitated to cite cases involving the act as
authority in otherwise unrelated areas of labor law. Thus the instant decision may serve as precedent for similar appeals in other
industries, especially if they are found to be charged with a public
duty.
But regardless of future expansion, it is submitted that the
instant case creates an imbalance ° in the railway labor process that
unions are unlikely to overcome.41 If taking such a step is truly
necessary to maintain the vital function of carrier operations in the
present economic complex, it would seem to be a congressional
rather than judicial prerogative.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.

Real Property-Discontinuance of Dedicated StreetsDisposition of Property
Having been established by dedication, a street retains its status
as a public way until it is discontinued in a manner provided by law.'
Generally, statutes provide that streets may legally cease to exist
Id. at 228. In light of the Court's reasoning, should conduct that discourages union membership be treated differently if the employer is able to
secure the approval of a lower court? This situation may arise in various
areas of labor law if the Florida East Coast decision is not limited to the
confines of the Railway Labor Act. For a consideration of such possibility
see note 39 infra and the accompanying text.
"E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955),
rev'd and remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956), in which the Supreme
Court cited Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) as
authority for reversing the lower court finding of "no jurisdiction" in a
racial discrimination case against the unions.
" E.g., Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1966), in which the board
cited Steele as authority for application of the duty of fair representation
in labor law.
o For the proposition that a balancing process is in order, i.e. weighing
the right to strike against the right of the employer to maintain his business, see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"Mr. Justice White considered the majority opinion "very close to a
judgment that there shall be no strikes in the transportation business, a
judgment which Congress rejected in drafting the Railway Labor Act." 384
U.S. at 250.
1 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COPPORATIONS § 30.182, at 101
(3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN].
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upon vacation by the direct action of the public, authorities or by
withdrawal from dedication in the case of non-use or abandonment
by the public.' Discontinuance of a street by either method effectually extinguishes the public rights in it.8 At this point a question
arises as to the ownership of the property within the boundaries of
the street.4 Two conflicting answers are found in the North Carolina statutes, both of which are applied by the North Carolina Supreme Court without regard to the inconsistency.
The North Carolina statutory scheme for vacation of a dedicated street5 embodies the majority rule6 that when a street is
vacated, title to the street vests in those persons owning land abutting on it.7 A different answer obtains when a street is withdrawn
from dedication in North Carolina,' as the dedicator, not the abutting landowner, is presumed to own the fee.9 However, where a
street sought to be withdrawn was dedicated by a now-extinct corporation, the abutting landowners take the property.'" The North
22 ELLIOT, ROADS AND STREETS

§ 1172 (4th ed. 1926); 11 McQuILLAN

§§ 30.184, .185.
'2 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 500 (Casner ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY]; 11 McQuILLAN § 30.202(a).
" See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 500-02; 11
MCQUILLAN § 30.202(a).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965) authorizes, the county
boards of commissioners "to close any street or road or portion thereof...
that is now or may hereafter be opened or dedicated, either by recording of
a subdivision plat or otherwise." Similar power is given to cities to "close

any street or alley that is now or may hereafter be opened ...

."

N.C. GEN.

§ 160-200(11) (1964). These statutes must be construed together
"so as to produce a harmonious body of legislation.... ." Town of Blowing
Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 371, 90 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1956).
' Cases cited note 26 infra and accompanying text.
'Upon the closing of a street or road in accordance with the provisions hereof, all right, title and interest in such portion of such street
or road shall be conclusively presumed to be vested in those persons,
firms or corporations owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to such
STAT.

portion of such street or road, and the title of each .

.

. shall, for the

width of the abutting land... extend to the center of such street or
road.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). Withdrawal of a dedicated street
is appropriate if the street "shall not have been actually opened and used by
the public within fifteen (15) years from and after the dedication thereof. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).

°Ibid.

o [Tihat where any corporation has dedicated any strip .

.

. of land

and said dedicating corporation is not now in existence, it shall
be conclusively presumed that the said corporation has no further
...

right, title or interest in said strip ...

the right, title and interest in
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Carolina court has expressly endorsed statutory disposition of street
property to the dedicator, as well as the principles underlying this
result," but by enforcing the statutory formula that allows the
abutting landowners to take the fee, the court has impliedly endorsed
a conflicting rationale and result.'
Disposition of street property to the dedicator is predicated on
the assumption that when a street is dedicated, the dedicator grants
easements of passage in the street to two distinct classes of persons, 1
but does not part with his title to it.Y4 When he 5 divides and plats
a tract of land into lots and streets, and sells lots with reference to
the plat,' 6 the sales operate as the dedicator's offer' 7 of the streets
to the public.' If the offer is accepted, 9 the public acquires easesaid strip . . . shall be conclusively presumed to be vested in those
persons, firms or corporations owning lots ... adjacent thereto....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). The statute doesn't provide how the fee

should vest in the adjacent landowners, that is, as tenants in common or
individually for the width of the abutting property. For a suggested answer,
see Lancaster, Withdrawal from Dedication and Closing of Roads, 13
N.C.B.A. BAR NOTES 5, 11 (Feb. 1962).
"1See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
1 See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
" Technically, the result of a common law dedication was an easement
in the public, and not some particular person, though the term is used today
to encompass both public and private rights resulting from dedication of
a street. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY H8 1099, 1103 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter
cited as TIFFANY].
1

"A common-law dedication . . . does not affect the ownership of the

land.... ." Id. § 1112, at 366; 11 MCQUILLAN §§ 33.03, at 635, 33.66, at 807,
33.68, at 809.
Only the owner can dedicate land, and he must evidence a clear and
1"

unequivocal intent to do so. 4

TIFFANY

§§ 1100-01.

"The plat does not have to be recorded to effect a valid dedication.
Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N.C. 685, 163 S.E.2d 804 (1932).
The offer is revocable before acceptance by the public. Steadman v.
Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960); Rowe v. City of
Durham, 235 N.C. 158, 69 S.E.2d 171 (1952).
18
Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965);
Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960) ; Town
of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898 (1956) ; Broocks
v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home Real Estate Loan
& Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
This method of dedicating streets is by far the most common method of
doing so. 11 MCQUILLAN § 33.22. Compare Todd v. White, 246 N.C. 59,
97 S.E.2d 439 (1957). There the court held that a sale with reference to a
plat did not effect a dedication where the dedicator expressly reserved the
right to control the streets.
The majority rule and the rule in North Carolina is that there must be
an offer and an acceptance by the public to constitute a valid dedication of
land to public use. E.g., Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112
S.E.2d 102 (1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90
S.E.2d 898 (1956); 11 MCQUILLAN § 33.02, at 628, and cases cited therein.
'"
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ments 20 in the streets lasting until the streets are discontinued.2 '

The sale of lots with reference to a plat also vests in every purchaser
an easement in any street shown on the plat necessary for reasonable access to his property." Regardless of acceptance or abandonment of public rights in a particular street, 3 a purchaser's easement
terminates only when the use of that street is no longer needed as
an access route.- 4 Though the street property is subject to these
In North Carolina, acceptance by the public can be shown by the public
authority's exercising acts of control over the streets, such as opening, improving, or maintaining them. Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509,
112 S.E.2d 102 (1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364,
90 S.E.2d 898 (1956).
" In North Carolina, the dedicator "is equitably estopped . . . in reference to the public . . . from denying the existence of the easement thus

created." Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 30, 76 S.E. 505, 507 (1912).
(Emphasis added.) See 11 MCQUILLAN §§ 33.66, .68; 4 TIFFANY § 1112.
Statutes in a few states provide that the public acquires the title to the
streets when they are dedicated. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 670; CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 139-1-7 (1963); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 711.07 (Page 1954);
OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 515 (1959). See generally 11 McQUILLAN
§§ 33.03, at 635, 33.69.
21 "[N]o
person shall have any right, or cause of action . . . [after a
street is withdrawn from dedication], to enforce any public . . . easement

therein." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). To the same effect is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965) which implies that public rights are extinguished upon vacation of the street, by giving "all right, title and interest
in ...

the street

. .

." to the abutting landowners.

" The purchaser
has a right in the street beyond that which is enjoyed by the general
public, or by himself as a member of the public, and different in kind,
since egress from and ingress to his own property is a necessity
peculiar to himself. The right is in the nature of an easement appurtenant to the property...
Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C. 166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633
(1942). Accord, Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 14 S.E.2d
376 (1965); Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102
(1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home
Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7
S.E.2d 13 (1940). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.54, at
493-94; 28 C.J.S. Easements §§ 39, 88 (1941); 11 MCQJILLAN § 33.73; 3
TIFFANY § 800. Abridgment or destruction of this easement by the public
is a compensable property taking. Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C.
166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1945).
Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 83 (1962) ; Janicki v. Lorek,
255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961); Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 62
S.E.2d 70 (1950); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889
(1943).
" Janicki v. Lorek, 255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961) ; Evans v. Horne,
226 N.C. 581, 39 S.E.2d 612 (1946). The withdrawal statute has "no application in any case where the continued use of any strip of land dedicated
2"

for street . . . purposes shall be necessary to afford convenient ingress or
egress to any lot . . . sold . . . by the dedicator of such street. . . ." N.C.
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easements, the dedicator's title is unaffected except to the extent that
the easements, for their duration, are encumbrances on it.25 Hence,
if the dedicator grants only easements, he obviously should be entitled to the reversion when the easements cease.
However, in most jurisdictions the property reverts to the abutting landowners instead of the dedicator.2 6 The rationale of such
disposition is based on the widely recognized principle that when a
dedicator sells a lot abutting on a street, he is presumed, in the
absence of express words to the contrary,2 7 to convey with the lot
the title to the center of the street.28 Thus, it is the abutting landGEN. STAT.

§ 136-96 (1964). Similarly, a street cannot be vacated unless

it appears "that no individual owning property in the vicinity of said street
.will thereby be deprived of reasonable means of ingress an egress to
his property.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965). However,
adverse possession can run against the holder of the access easement as well
as against the holder of the fee in the street if the public has not accepted
the street or if it has abandoned an accepted street. City of Salisbury v.
Barnhardt, 249 N.C. 549, 107 S.E.2d 297 (1959); Gault v. Town of Lake
Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E.2d 104 (1931).
'"See note 14 supra.
"0E.g., Main v. Legnitto, 230 Cal. App. 2d 667, 41 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Gorby v. McEndarfer, 135 Ind. App. 74, 191 N.E.2d 786
(1963); Board of Comm'rs v. Clark, 157 Kan. 132, 138 P.2d 449 (1943);
Valoppi v. Detroit Eng'r & Mach. Co., 339 Mich. 674, 64 N.W.2d 884
(1954); American Steel & Wire Co. v. City of St Louis, 354 Mo. 692, 190
S.W.2d 919 (1945); Greenberg v. L.I. Snodgrass Co., 161 Ohio St. 351, 119
N.E.2d 292 (1954); Fenton v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co., 17 Utah
2d 99, 404 P.2d 966 (1965); Bond v. Green, 189 Va. 23, 52 S.E.2d 169
(1949); Woehler v. George, 65 Wash. 2d 519, 398 P.2d 167 (1965). See
generally 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 501; 11 MCQUILLAN
§ 30.202(a), at 161-63; 3 TIFFANY § 931.
7
E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Milner, 275 Ala. 104, 152 So. 2d 431 (1962);
Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa. 264, 106 A.2d 461 (1954); Williams v. Miller, 184
Va.274, 35 S.E.2d 127 (1945).
. E.g., Taylor v. Continental Southern Corp., 104 Cal. App. 2d 425, 233
P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); St. Clair Co. Housing Authority v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 387 Ill. 180, 56 N.E.2d 357 (1944); Hylton v.
Belcher, 290 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1956); Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d
561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); Burkett v. Ross, 227 Miss. 315, 86 So. 2d 33
(1956); Skrmetta v. Moore, 202 Miss. 585, 30 So. 2d 53 (1947); Luneau
v. MacDonald, 103 N.H. 273, 173 A.2d 44 (1961); Snyder v. County of
Monroe, 2 Misc. 2d 946, 153 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Perkins v.
Village of Mexico, 200 Misc. 2d 294, 102 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Finlaw v. Hunter, 87 Ohio App. 543, 96 N.E.2d 319 (1949); McLaughlin
v. Cybulski, 192 Pa. Super. 7, 159 A.2d 14 (1960); Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa.
264, 106 A.2d 461 (1954); Newman v. Mayor of City of Newport, 73 R.I.
385, 57 A.2d 173 (1948); State v. Williams, 161 Tex. 1, 335 S.W.2d 834
(1960); City of Houston v. Hughes, 284 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955); Heller v. Woodley, 202 Va. 994, 121 S.E.2d 527 (1961). See generally 3 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.112; Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 982
(1956).
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owner and not the dedicator whose property is subject to the private
access 29 and public30 easements created by dedicating a street. Consequently, when a street is no longer needed as an access route and
when the public surrenders its rights in it, the abutting landowner
is entitled to the fee in that portion of the street adjacent to his
property.3 '
The point of divergence of the North Carolina statutes is the
determination of whether to accept the majority rule that abutting
landowners acquire title or to assume that they acquire only access
easements. The withdrawal statute,32 excluding that portion dealing
with dedication by now-extinct corporations, 3 3 apparently codifies
the view that the abutting landowner has only an access easement.
Hence, title to the dedicated street remains in the dedicator,3 4 and
the unencumbered fee necessarily reverts to him when the public35
and private3 6 easements cease. But both the vacation statute37 and
the provision in the withdrawal statute relating to streets dedicated
by now-extinct corporations"' embody the majority rule that the
abutting landowner is entitled to the reversion.39 The implication is
that he, not the dedicator, held the title to the street during the continuance of the public and private easements.
The inconsistency, however, is not confined to the statutes, for
the North Carolina Supreme Court has enforced statutory disposition of street property both to the dedicator 0 and to the abutting
landowner 4 but on the basis of reasoning that militates against anyone other than the dedicator taking the property. 42 The court has
"' See note 22 supra. Similarly, the abutting landowner acquires not only
his title to the street adjacent to his property, but also an access easement
over the other abutting landowners' fees in whatever streets he needs for
purposes of ingress to and egress from his property.
See note 20 supra.
s See note 26 supra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
"Ibid.

'See note 14 supra.
"See note 21 supra.

The private access easement must have terminated before the street
can be discontinued. See note 24 supra.
IT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
"See notes 7 & 10 supra.
40Russell v. Coggins, 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950);
Sheets v.
Walsh, 217 N.C. 32, 6 S.E.2d 817 (1940).
'* Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
,See note 43 infra.
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unequivocally declared that the abutting landowner acquires nothing
more than a general access easement. 43 Thus, when a street is discontinued, the dedicator should always be entitled to the property
simply because, under this view, he never parted with his title to
it.14 How, then, can the court give effect to a statute allowing the

abutting landowners to take the street property when, on the basis
of the court's own reasoning, it follows that the dedicator is thereby
deprived of his property without due process of law?" Yet disposition of street property to abutting landowners was squarely upheld
46
in Steadman v. Town of Pinetops.
In trying to effectuate the different statutory mandates while
simultaneously adhering to the principles it has announced, the
court has produced a body of case law that is of little assistance in
determining the validity of a title to street property at any given
time. The statutory conflict could be resolved and a practical solution effected by an amendment to the withdrawal statute47 provid-

ing that the abutting landowner takes the fee in the street upon
withdrawal, regardless of who the dedicator was. The abutting landowner has an obvious interest in having the strip of land attach to
his property when the street is discontinued, while the same strip of
land without the lots adjacent to it would be of little practical importance to the dedicator. Assuming that lots with street frontage
are more valuable than ones without, the abutting landowner probably paid more for a lot with this benefit and, consequently, should
""[T]he owner of abutting property has a right in the street
[which] is in the nature of an easement appurtenant to the property ..
Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C. 166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633
(1942). (Emphasis added.) "Purchasers of lots sold with reference to the
recorded map . .. acquire vested rights to have all and each of the streets
shown on the map kept open." Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243
N.C. 364, 368, 90 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1956). "The original owners, having
sold lots with reference to the plat . . . are estopped to deny, as against
the purchasers of lots, the existence of the easement in ... a purchaser of a
lot. . . ." Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 232, 25 S.E.2d 889, 892
(1943). (Emphasis added.)
"See notes 14 and 22 supra.
""The Legislature cannot sanction the taking of one's property unless
(a) in satisfaction of a legal obligation, or (b) for a public purpose (citing
cases); and when taken for a public purpose, just compensation must be
paid." In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 8, 134 S.E.2d 85, 91 (1964).
According to the reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court, statutory
disposition of street property to the abutting landowners falls into neither of
these categories.
" 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
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be entitled to his money's worth when the street is discontinued."
To be certain that the abutting landowners' property rights under
the statutes are protected from judicial interference,49 both the withdrawal statue"0 and the vacation statute51 could also provide that the
abutting landowners take the fee in the streets unless the dedicator
expressly reserved it. Such an amendment would negate the possibility of the dedicator's due process argument against the abutting
landowners who statutorily would be entitled to the street property.
Should the dedicator wish to retain the fee when he dedicates streets,
he is required to do no more than make his desire explicit to protect
his interests from application of the statutes.8 2 These amendments
would definitively resolve the existing conceptual conflict evidenced
by the court's treatment of the problem, and would eliminate any
necessity for time-consuming litigation of rights under the statutes
as they now stand.
SUSAN HAUGHTON EHRINGHAUS

"For a good discussion of the reasons why such a rule should apply,
see Finlaw v. Hunter, 87 Ohio App. 543, 96 N.E.2d 319 (1949).
'"That is, judicial interference because of the constitutional issue involved.
°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
" Such a requirement is not an unreasonable burden on the dedicator.
If he has not reserved the fee, he will be presumed to have surrendered it
to the abutting landowners.

